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PARTAKER OR PREY? FUTURES
COMMISSION MERCHANTS UNDER CIVIL
RICO AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE
ACT
I. Introduction
As an industry grows and prospers, litigation connected with that
industry inevitably increases. Since 1970, the aggregate volume of
commodity futures contracts' traded on designated contract markets
(exchanges) 2 has swelled from about fourteen million to over 228
million.'
1. Section 2(a)(1)(A) of the Commodity Exchange Act defines "commodity" as
wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, butter, eggs, fats and oils,
soybeans, livestock, frozen concentrated orange juice, other enumerated products, "and
all other goods or articles .... and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts
for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in" except onions. 7 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1982).
A commodity futures contract is an agreement between a seller and buyer that the
seller will deliver and the buyer will accept, at a price agreed on through competitive
bidding on an exchange floor, a specified quantity and grade of an identified commodity
during a defined period in the future. I P. JomsoN, CoMoDrrms REGULATION
§ 1.03, at 8 (1982) [hereinafter JomsoN]. Every aspect of a futures contract is
standardized except the price, which is negotiated by and disseminated to other traders.
Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1980), affd sub nom. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). Contract standards
describing the quantity (size), quality (grade), and delivery terms (time, place and
method) make futures contracts fungible and, hence, easy to trade. Curran, 456 U.S.
at 358.
2. The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) defines a board of trade as any in-
corporated or unincorporated exchange or association of persons in the business of
buying or selling any commodity, or receiving the same for sale on consignment.
CEA § 2(a)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 4(a) of the Act prohibits transactions
for the purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery unless "such transaction
is conducted on or subject to the rules of a board of trade which has been designated
by the [Commodity Futures Trading] Commission as a 'contract market' for such
commodity." 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982). Section 5 of the CEA lists the conditions and
requirements that must be met for the Commission (CFTC) to designate a board of
trade as a "contract market." See 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1982). The CFTC is the federal
agency charged with regulating the commodity exchanges and accounts, agreements
and transactions executed on these exchanges. See CEA §§ 2(a)(1)(A), 2(a)(1)(B)(2)(A),
7 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4a(a)(1) (1982).
The following excerpt from a Second Circuit opinion outlines the fundamentals of
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Several years after Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO or the Act)4 in 1970, customers5
the futures markets and the role of their participants:
The person who has sold a futures contract, i.e., someone committed to
deliver the commodity in the future, is said to be in a "short" position.
Conversely, someone committed to accept delivery is "long".... [Outside
of the] rare instances [in which delivery of the commodity actually occurs],
the short and the long must liquidate. their positions prior to the close of
trading in the particular futures contract.... A person seeking to liquidate
his futures position must form an opposite contract for the same quantity,
so that his obligations under the two contracts will offset each other. Thus,
a short who does not intend to deliver the commodity must purchase an
equal number of long contracts; a long must sell an equal number of short
contracts. Money is made or lost in the price different[ial] between the
original contract and the offsetting transaction. If the price of the future[s
contract] has declined [between the time of the initial and offsetting trans-
actions], . . . the short will realize a profit; if the futures price has risen
[between the time of the initial and offsetting transactions], ... the long
will realize a profit....
... An individual [customer] wishing to invest in the futures market
approaches a "futures commission merchant" (FCM) .... The FCM will
demand a "margin" payment from the customer, which is simply a security
deposit designed to protect against adverse price movements .... The FCM
relays its customer's order to one of its "floor brokers" trading on the
exchange. The broker stands on the outside of a "pit" or "ring" around
which are gathered other persons trading the same [futures] contract....
Contracts are made by "open outcry".... Someone willing to enter the
contract responds across the pit ... and the deal is made. Observers ...
record the transaction and feed the information into a communications
system, publicizing it to other[s] .... The broker [subsequently] relays the
particulars [which are the price and quantity] of the deal to the FCM, who
informs the customer.
Leist, 638 F.2d at 286-87 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
3. See FuTruRs INDusTRY ASSOCIATION (FIA), Volume of Futures Trading 1960
Through 1987 (Graph).
4. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84
Stat. 922, 941-48 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (ch. 96) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986)).
5. A customer is "any person trading, intending to trade, or receiving or seeking
advice concerning any commodity interest." CFTC Reg. § 166.1(c), 17 C.F.R.
§ 166.1(c) (1987). in general, a "commodity interest" refers to ."[a]ny contract for
the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery, traded on or subject to
the rules of a contract market." CFTC Reg. § 166.1(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 166.1(b)(l)
(1987).
There are two types of customers: "hedgers" and "speculators." Hedgers are persons
who take a position in the futures market opposite to their interests in a physical
(cash) commodity. I JoHNsoN, supra note 1, § 1.12, at 38. They seek the profit
generated by the production or processing of the particular commodity. Curran, 456
U.S. at 359. To protect. that profit, hedgers utilize the futures markets to transfer
the risks they inevitably confront in the "spot" or cash market. See Leist, 638 F.2d
at 287. CFTC regulations define "bona fide hedging" as "transactions or positions
in a contract for future delivery on any contract market ... where such transactions
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of the commodity futures industry began to use "civil RICO ' 6 as
or positions normally represent a substitute for transactions to be made or positions
to be taken at a later time in a physical marketing channel, and where they are
economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and management
of a commercial enterprise." CFTC Reg. § 1.3(z), 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z) (1987).
The owner (potential seller) of a commodity enters into equivalent short futures
contracts to hedge against declining prices. Leist, 638 F.2d at 287. Because movements
in futures and cash prices normally correspond, Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d
1154, 1157 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Cargill, Inc. v. Butz, 406 U.S.
932 (1972), any loss caused by a decline in the price of the cash commodity is generally
offset by a corresponding gain in the futures market, which accrues upon liquidation
of the futures position. Leist, 638 F.2d at 287-88. Similarly, a processor (potential
buyer) of a commodity can hedge against price increases by purchasing the equivalent
futures contracts. Id. at 287. A loss caused by higher prices for the cash commodity
is offset by the profits generated in the futures market upon liquidation of the futures
position. Id. at 287-88.
In this sense, the futures markets serve an important "insurance" function, Cargill,
452 F.2d at 1158, whose benefits "extend beyond the immediate participants in the
transactions." Leist, 638 F.2d at 288. Indeed, Congress has concluded, "Because
hedging of price risks in a futures market enables a merchant to reduce the exposures
he has in doing business, he is able to operate on a lower profit margin with consequent
lower prices to the consumer." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 975,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 132-33 (1974)) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 975]; see S. REP. No.
1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5843, 5859.
Commodity futures markets could not function, however, if hedgers were the sole
participants. Leist, 638 F.2d at 288. Having no interest in the underlying cash market,
speculators are essential because they assume the risks that hedgers endeavor to shift.
Id. Speculators seek financial rewards by taking positions in the futures markets.
Curran, 456 U.S. at 359. These speculators-who represent all segments of the public-
bear the price risks that hedgers are unwilling to endure solely for the opportunity
of profit. Leist, 638 F.2d at 288 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 975, supra, at 138). Congress
has long recognized the importance of this group and its role in the industry:
The activity of speculators is essential to the operation of a futures market
in that the composite bids and offers of large numbers of individuals tend
to broaden a market, thus making possible the execution with minimum
price disturbance of the larger trade hedging orders. By increasing the
number of bids and offers available at any given price level, the speculator
usually helps to minimize price fluctuations rather than to intensify them.
Without the trading activity of the speculative fraternity, the liquidity, so
badly needed in futures markets, simply would not exist. Trading volume
would be restricted materially since, without a host of speculative orders
in the trading ring, many larger trade orders ... would simply go un-
filled....
Id. (emphasis added).
6. RICO provides three remedies. See RICO §§ 1963-1964, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-
1964 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). "Civil RICO," which is the subject of this Note,
permits a private plaintiff to recover treble damages for injury to his business or
property caused by a violation of § 1962 of RICO. Id. § 1964(c) (1982). See infra
notes 12-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of pertinent RICO provisions.
Another remedy, "criminal RICO," allows the Justice Department to prosecute viol-
ations of § 1962, and includes the following penalties: a fine of not more than $25,000,
1988]
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a remedy7 for fraud' essentially redressed by the Commodity Ex-
imprisonment for not more than 20 years and forfeiture of any interest acquired or
maintained in violation of § 1962. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (Supp. IV 1986). See, e.g.,
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (forfeiture case). Finally, §§ 1964(a)-
1964(b) authorize the Justice Department to seek an order requiring the defendant to
divest himself of any interest in any enterprise, as well as an order imposing restrictions
on the future conduct of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(a)-1964(b) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986).
7. See infra note 25 for cases involving the use of RICO by commodity futures
customers. In fact, the Supreme Court noted that of 270 district court RICO decisions
decided before 1985, only 3%o (nine cases) were decided prior to 1980. See Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 n.1 (1985).
8. The Commodity Exchange Act performs a prophylactic function: it prohibits
the impairment of the normal operations of the futures markets, and protects the
customers or users of those markets from harmful conduct by customers' agents and
fiduciaries. See I JoHNsoN, supra note 1, § 1.85, at 191; see also infra note 31
(discussing fiduciary nature of customers' relationships with futures commission mer-
chants (FCMs)). Experts generally refer to "impairment" of the futures markets as
market manipulation and to the "harmful conduct" of customers' agents and fiduciaries
as fraud. See II JOHNsON, supra note 1, § 5.00, at 231.
Market manipulation is the conscious causation of an artificial price of a commodity
in the cash or futures markets or both. 1 T. Russo, REGULATION OF THE COMMODniIES
FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS § 12.10, at 12-17 (1987) [hereinafter Russo]. Fraud,
on the other hand, encompasses a host of activities that may be perpetrated against
a customer including (1) "churning," (2) unauthorized trading, (3) failing to segregate
customer funds, (4) misrepresentation, (5) making false account statements or records
and (6) noncompetitive trading. See I JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 1.88, at 194-95. These
activities are largely prohibited by the CEA's "anti-fraud" § 4b.
Churning is the execution of trades for a customer's account in such volume or
frequency as to render those trades excessive, 1 Russo, supra, § 12.35, at 12-66; that
is, they cannot be justified vis-a-vis the customer's trading objectives or the duty of
the agent (FCM) to preserve its client's assets. II JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 5.45, at
333-34; see Shutvet v. Breinling, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 23,520, at 33,403 (CFTC Mar. 11, 1987); Berisko v. Eastern Capital Corp.,
[1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,274, at 29,398 (CFTC
June 27, 1984), modified and aff'd, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 22,772, at 31,224 (CFTC Oct. 1, 1985); Smith v. Siegel Trading Co., [1980-
1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,105, at 24,452 (CFTC Sept.
3, 1980). Since FCMs and their agents or employees earn income in proportion to
the number of customer trades executed, II JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 5.45, at 333,
such trades are executed for the purpose of generating commissions rather than
advancing the customer's interests. Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 785 F.2d 1274, 1276 n.4 (5th Cir. 1986); 1 Russo,
supra, § 12.35, at 12-66; see Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132,
133-34 (8th Cir. 1970); see also Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
567 F.2d 1174, 1176 (2d Cir. 1977) (FCM allegedly deviated from agreed commodity
program to generate commissions through excessive trading); see, e.g., Piskur v.
International Precious Metals Corp., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 22,493, at 30,187 (CFTC Jan. 2, 1985) (commissions and fees of $177,000
out of gross investment of $130,000 "quite beneficial" to FCM and its agent, but
yielded "virtually no benefits" to customer); In re Lincolnwood Commodities, Inc.,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,986, at 28,249 (CFTC
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Jan. 31, 1984) (commissions generated by FCM's agent at times exceeded 50% of
the equity in customers' accounts), amended on other grounds, [1984-1986 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,588, at 30,534-35 (CFTC May 8, 1985);
In re Big Red Commodity Corp., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 21,390, at 25,883 (CFTC Feb. 23, 1982) (while not all of employee's frauds
benefited FCM, it received commissions on all trades placed by employee), modified
and aff'd, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,623, at
30,670 (CFTC June 7, 1985). See infra note 31 for a discussion of the title and
function of pertinent FCM agents and employees.
Unauthorized trading occurs when an FCM effects a trade on behalf of its customer
without his specific or written authorization. II JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 5.46, at
339-40; see Haltmier v. CFTC, 554 F.2d 556, 560 (2d Cir. 1977); Silverman v. CFTC,
549 F.2d 28, 31-32 (7th Cir. 1977). CFTC regulations, which prohibit unauthorized
trading, define "specifically authorized" as a customer's enumeration of both the
commodity and the quantity of futures contracts based on that commodity he wants
bought or sold. See CFTC Reg. § 166.2, 17 C.F.R. § 166.2 (1987); see also Couch
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 23,209, at 32,575 (CFTC Aug. 20, 1986) (cancelling customer's prior order
to comport with trading position intended by subsequent order was not unauthorized).
Like "churning," unauthorized trading generates illicit income for an FCM in breach
of its fiduciary duty towards its customers. See Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co.
Commodities, 688 F.2d 1193, 1196 (8th Cir. 1982); Herman v. T & S Commodities,
Inc., 592 F. Supp. 1406, 1413-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Austin v. Lundgren, [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,004, at 31,981 (CFTC Apr. 16,
1986); see also 1 Russo, supra, § 12.36, at 12-70 (essence of unauthorized trading is
breach of fiduciary duty).
An FCM's use of its customers' funds, other than as margin or security for their
trade positions, constitutes a conversion of those funds. II JOHNSON, supra note 1,
§ 5.54, at. 365-66; see Lincolnwood, 21,986, at 28,238 n.50; In re Clancy, [1977-
1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,905, at 23,676 (CFTC Sept.
25, 1979), modified and aff'd, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 21,126, at 24,564 (CFTC Nov. 25, 1980); Carfield v. Comstock Inv. Mgmt.
Corp., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,607, at 22,506-
07 (CFTC May 11, 1978). "Margin" is the amount of money a customer deposits
with his FCM to secure or guarantee the futures contracts executed on his behalf.
F. HoRN, TRADINc IN ComMoDrry FuTuxnRs 77 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter HoRN];'see
Crabtree Invs., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 577 F. Supp.
1466, 1470 n.7 (M.D. La.), aff'd without. opinion, 738 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1984). In
theory, margin money protects both the seller and the buyer of a futures contract
from a default by the other in the event of an adverse price movement. HoRN, supra,
at 77. The customer deposits "initial margin" with the FCM when he first opens his
account. See Crabtree, 577 F. Supp. at 1470 & n.7. "Maintenance margin" is required
of the customer when the market has moved in a direction adverse to his position,
thereby diminishing the equity. of his initial margin by more than 25%. Id. at 1470
n.8; HORN, supra, at 77. Thus, when a customer's account equity falls below this
amount, the FCM issues a "margin call" requiring the customer to deposit additional
funds to restore his account to its initial equity. Crabtree, 577 F. Supp. at 1470 n.8;
see HORN, supra, at 77.
The segregation of customer funds such as margin money from FCM (house) funds
is unambiguously mandated in § 4d(2) of the CEA:
[FCMs must treat all money, securities and property they receive] to margin,
guarantee, or secure the trades or contracts of any customer.., or accruing
to such customer as the result of such trades or contracts, as belonging
19881
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to such customer. Such money, securities, and property shall be separately
accounted for and shall not be commingled with the funds of such [futures]
commission merchant ...
7 U.S.C. § 6d(2) (1982). Moreover, conversion of customer funds may also implicate
the anti-fraud provisions of § 4b of the Act set forth infra. See Clancy, 21,126,
at 24,561 & n.4; Carfield, 20,607, at 22,506; II JomsoN, supra note 1, § 5.54, at
366.
Although an FCM must treat all its customers' funds as belonging strictly to them,
CEA § 4d(2), 7 U.S.C. § 6d(2) (1982); CFTC Reg. § 1.20(c), 17 C.F.R. § 1.20(c)
(1987); I JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 1.36, at 105, the FCM may pool its customers'
funds into a clearly identified account for convenience or investment purposes. I
JOHNsON, supra note 1, § 1.36, at 105. Section 4d(2) of the CEA expressly allows
such funds to be invested in certain guaranteed federal and state obligations, provided
the investments are made in accordance with CFTC regulations. 7 U.S.C. § 6d(2)
(1982). Commission Reg. §§ 1.26-1.27 require FCMs to maintain specific records of
such investments, 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.26-1.27 (1987); however, Reg. § 1.29 permits FCMs
to retain any income realized on the investments, including interest and resale income.
17 C.F.R. § 1.29 (1987); see Crabtree, 577 F. Supp. at 1473; 1 Russo, supra, § 4.26,
at 4-44.
In addition to the duty to segregate customer funds, FCMs must also disclose all
material facts regarding or affecting customers' accounts. II JOHNSON, supra note 1,
§ 5.49, at 353. This duty of disclosure, grounded in common law and firmly rooted
under § 4b of the CEA, impels FCMs and their employees-as well as other industry
professionals standing in a fiduciary relationship with a customer-to "exercise the
utmost good faith and to fully and fairly disclose all material facts." 1 Russo, supra,
§ 12.33, at 12-60 (emphasis in original); see Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.,
[1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,973 (CFTC
Apr. 10, 1980), aff'd mem. sub nom. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc. v. CFTC, 673
F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1982). Of course, the amount of disclosure required depends on
the extent to which the customer relies upon the professional's judgment to trade. II
JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 5.49, at 353. Compare Gordon, 21,016, at 23,974 &
23,981 n.37 (customer "reposed trust and confidence" in the broker) with Shearson
Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Leach, 583 F.2d 367, 371-72 (7th Cir. 1978) (customer made
"all the investment decisions"). See infra note 31 for the factors considered to determine
the extent of a customer's reliance on the professional. Despite potential liability under
§ 4b, however, the lure of earning commissions or other income through the customer
sometimes entices certain industry professionals to breach the fiduciary duty owed to
their customers by omitting or misrepresenting material facts. See, e.g., Valek v.
Murlas Commodities, Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,908, at 34,216 (CFTC
Sept. 9, 1987) (FCM's agent misrepresented his experience to induce customer to allow
agent to trade the customer's account, which was then "churned"); Seligman v. First
Commodity Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,790,
at 34,085 (CFTC Aug. 13, 1987) (FCM's agentmade material misrepresentations to
customers solely to generate additional commissions); Beatty v. Comvest, Inc., [1980-
1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,213, at 25,065 (CFTC June
17, 1981) (FCM induced customer to invest by misrepresenting various facts in violation
of § 4b of CEA).
The creation of false records or reports is another form of misrepresentation, one
which not only deceives the customer, but possibly others as well. II JoHNSON, supra
note 1, § 5.53, at 363; see CFTC v. Pyne Commodities Corp., 502 F. Supp. 194,
196 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd mem., 681 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1981). Section 4b(B) of the
CEA clearly proscribes the willful falsification of customers' reports or records by
anyone acting on their behalf. 7 U.S.C. § 6b(B) (1982); see In re Shatner, 11986-
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1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,996, at 31,958 (CFTC Mar.
28, 1986). Note 31, infra, describes types of reports FCMs issue to and on behalf
of customers.
Once the customer has placed his order with an FCM or a broker, he intends to
have his order forwarded to a particular contract market for execution. See Clark,
Geneology and Genetics of "Contract of Sale of a Commodity for Future Delivery"
in the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1175, 1188 n.46 (1978) [hereinafter
Clark]. FCMs and their agents may trade for their own or affiliated accounts as well
as for customers' accounts. 1 Russo, supra, § 4.16, at 4-25. This practice is known
as dual trading. Id. Thus, besides the temptation to generate additional commissions,
FCMs and their affiliated persons, which term includes employees, see CFTC Reg.
§ 155.1, 17 C.F.R. § 155.1 (1987), may be tempted to abuse their knowledge of
customers' orders to effect personal transactions before the market is affected by the
execution of the customers' orders. I JOHNsON, supra note 1, § 1.37, at 107.
Noncompetitive trades are those removed from normal market forces, stripping the
customer of any meaningful execution of his trades. See 1 Russo, supra, § 12.47, at
12-96 to 12-97. "Bucketing," for example, involves a failure to transmit a customer's
order to an exchange "ring" for execution, or otherwise "filling" that order without
subjecting it to "open outcry" in an exchange ring. I JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 2.27,
at 257-58; see Pyne, 502 F. Supp. at 195-96; In re Siegel Trading Co., [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,452, at 21,840 (CFTC July 26,
1977), vacated on other grounds, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 20,637, at 22,602 (CFrC June 21, 1978). If the firm or broker, while
pretending a contract was formed on an exchange, does not cause the order to be
so executed and instead places the order in its or his own "bucket," that firm or
broker is guilty of bucketing the customer's order. See Clark, supra, at 1188 n.46.
In short, this practice plainly deprives the customer of his right to the competitive
execution of his trades. II JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 5.37, at 301. Such actions may
also violate CEA § 4h, which makes it unlawful to falsely represent that an order
was executed on an exchange. See 7 U.S.C. § 6h (1982); In re Cayman Assocs., [1986-
1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,033, at 32,050 (CFTC Apr.
21, 1986).
The improper or noncompetitive execution of a customer's order by an industry
professional invariably causes that order to be wagered against that of the professional's:
he wins only if the customer loses, even if his gain is not directly drawn from the
customer's loss. See Clark, supra, at 1188 n.46. Section 4b(D) of the CEA, codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 6b(D) (1982), focuses on the improper execution of a customer's orders,
irrespective of whether the customer benefits. II JoHNsoN, supra note 1, § 5.37, at
302. The "evil" which the section seeks to remedy is not so much fraud, but a
breach of fiduciary duty; that is, the failure of the customer's agent-whether it be
an FCM, its affiliated persons, or other industry professionals-to strictly advance
the interests of the customer. See Clark, supra, at 1188 n.46. Note 31, infra, discusses
this fiduciary agency relationship in detail and lists specific CFrC regulations designed
to bolster this relationship.
The anti-fraud § 4b of the CEA, which prohibits commodity fraud such as churning,
unauthorized trading, misrepresentation, false accounting and noncompetitive trading,
states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful (1) for any member of a contract market, or for any
correspondent, agent, or employee of any member, in or in connection
with any order to make, or the making of, any contract of sale of any
commodity in interstate commerce, made, or to be made, ... for or on
behalf of any other person, or (2) for any person ...
(A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other
person;
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change Act (CEA).9 The CEA, promulgated to protect the futures
markets and their participants from market manipulation and fraud, 10
allows customers to recover actual damages for injuries sustained
by violations of the statute."
Civil RICO, however, entitles "any person' '1 2 to recover treble
damages if he has been injured in his business or property "by
reason of"'3 a defendant's violation of section 1962 of the Act. 4
Section 1962(a), for eiample, prohibits "any person"' 5 from using
(B) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person any
false report or statement thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to be
entered for such person any false record thereof;
(C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other person by any
means whatsoever in regard to any such order or contract or the
disposition or execution of any such order or contract, or in regard to
any act of agency performed with respect to such order or contract for
such person; or
(D) to bucket such order, or to fill such order by offset against the
order or orders of any other person, or Willfully and knowingly and
without the prior consent of such person to become the buyer in respect
to any selling order of such person, or become the seller in respect to
any buying order of such person....
7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The section, therefore, applies to contract
market members (e.g., FCMs and their agents or employees) acting in a representative
or fiduciary capacity for other persons (i.e., customers). See II JoHNsoN, supra note
1, § 5.40, at 324. But see Hill v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 790 F.2d 817,
823-24 (10th Cir. 1986) (although FCM owed customer fiduciary duty, § 4b violation
requires willful conduct as it "makes no mention of fiduciary duties"). See infra
notes 19-32 and accompanying text for an explanation of how the above commodity
fraud becomes actionable under RICO.
9. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See supra note 8 for a discussion
of commodity fraud; infra notes 97-99, 110-15 and accompanying text for the remedies
provided in the CEA.
10. See infra notes 77-125 and accompanying text. See supra note 8 for a description
of commodity market manipulation and fraud.
11. See infra notes 110-15, 313-19 and accompanying text.
12. RICO § 1964(c), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982); see infra note 14 and accompanying
text.
13. See supra note 12.
14. Section 1964(c) of RICO provides the following:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (emphasis added); see infra notes 15-28 and accompanying
text.
15. RICO § 1962, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982); see infra note 28 and accompanying
text. The term "person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal
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or investing any income derived directly or indirectly from a "pattern
of racketeering activity '1 6 in an "enterprise"'" that affects interstate
commerce.18
The large umbrella of "racketeering activity" defined in section
1961(1)(B) of RICO contains acts which are indictable under certain
provisions of title 18 of the United States Code, including mail
fraud and wire fraud. 9 Mail fraud is committed by using the mails
to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud. 20 Mailings are considered
in furtherance of a scheme to defraud if they are incidental to an
essential part of that scheme. 21 The wire fraud statute is equally
broad.22 "All that is needed for violation[s] of this [statute] are a
or beneficial interest in property. RICO § 1961(3), 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982). See
infra notes 166-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether the same
corporation may be both the culpable "person" and the "enterprise" under RICO.
16. RICO §§ 1962(a)-1962(c), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)-1962(c) (1982).
17. RICO §§ 1962(a)-1962(c), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)-1962(c) (1982). Section 1961(4)
of RICO defines "enterprise" as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association
or other legal entity," as well as "any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
18. RICO § 1962(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982). See infra note 28 for the pertinent
text. To satisfy the "interstate commerce" element, the enterprise must engage in or
affect interstate commerce. See United States v. Groff, 643 F.2d 396, 400 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Turbyfill v. United States, 454 U.S. 828 (1981). A minimal
relationship between the enterprise and interstate commerce, however, is sufficient.
See United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom.
Little v. United States, 445 U.S. 946 (1980). In short, the interstate commerce element
of RICO is interpreted very broadly. Beth Israel Medical Center v. Smith, 576 F.
Supp. 1061, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Congress has determined that the commodity
futures industry, of which futures commission merchants are an integral part, see
infra note 31, substantially affects the nation's interstate commerce. See infra notes
77-82, 121-25 and accompanying text.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). Other listed provisions of title 18
include § 201 (bribery), § 664 (embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), §§ 891-
894 (extortionate credit transactions), § 1084 (transmission of gambling information),
§ 1503 (obstruction of justice), § 1951 (interference with commerce), § 1952 (racket-
eering), § 1955 (illegal gambling operations) and § 1956 (laundering monetary instru-
ments). The individual acts of racketeering activity, such as mail or wire fraud, are
usually described as "predicate offenses" or "predicate acts. '" Haroco, Inc. v. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd per curiam, 473
U.S. 606 (1985).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); see United States v. Wormick, 709 F.2d 454, 461-
62 (7th Cir. 1983). When one acts with knowledge that use of the mails will follow
in the ordinary course of business, or when such use can reasonably be foreseen even
though not actually intended, then he "causes" the mails to be used. Pereira v. United
States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954).
21. Wormick, 709 F.2d at 462.
22. United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 903 (8th Cir. 1975) (citation omitted),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976). Wire fraud is committed by transmitting or causing
to be transmitted "by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate
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scheme to defraud and at least one jurisdictional telephone call
made in furtherance of that scheme. ' 23 Each mailing or use of the
wires, although promoting a single scheme to defraud, constitutes
a separate offense under the mail and wire fraud statutes. 24
The typical commodity fraud proscribed by the CEA requires use
of the mails or wires to perpetrate the fraud against the customer,
thereby giving rise to claims of mail or wire fraud.25 Once a de-
fendant has committed the predicate acts of mail or wire fraud, a
customer can generally satisfy RICO's "pattern" element by proving
that two acts of racketeering activity occurred within ten years of
each other,26 although certain jurisdictions require more. 27
or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds" to execute a
scheme or artifice to defraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982); see United States v. Brien,
617 F.2d 299, 307 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980).
23. Banco de Desarrollo Agropecuario, S.A. v. Gibbs, 640 F. Supp. 1168, 1175
(S.D. Fla. 1986) (citing United States v. Patterson, 534 F.2d 1113, 1114 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 942 (1976)).
24. Calvert, 523 F.2d at 903 n.6. See Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316
(1987), and McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987), for the Supreme Court's
pronouncement on the property rights protected by the mail and wire fraud statutes.
25. See Mayaja, Inc., S.A. v. Bodkin, 803 F.2d 157, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1986),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Shearson Lehman Bros. v. Mayaja, Inc., 167 S.
Ct. 3205 (1987); Brien, 617 F.2d at 307-08; Wichita Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Landmark Group, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 1182, 1189 (D. Kan. 1987); Roche v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 658 F. Supp. 315, 317-18 & n.5 (M.D. Pa. 1986); Gaudette v. Panos,
644.F. Supp. 826, 839 (D. Mass. 1986), modified on rehearing, 650 F. Supp. 912 (D.
Mass. 1987); Ghouth v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1325, 1332 (N.D.
Il1. 1986); Fustok v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1076, 1077-78 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 23 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
see also Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co. Commodities, 688 F.2d 1193, 1200 (8th
Cir. 1982) (customer inundated with documents mailed by FCM); Hall v. Paine Webber
Jackson & Curtis, Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
22,665, at 30,829 (CFTC July 16, 1985) (FCM's employees used telephones and let-
ters in furtherance of fraud), modified and aff'd, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,317, at 32,891 (CFTC Oct. 8, 1986); II JOHNsON, supra
note 1, § 5.63, at 412 (nearly all activities of industry professionals involve use of
mails, telephone, telegraph and other interstate commerce instruments).
26. See RICO § 1961(5), 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). The section "requires at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occured after [October 15, 1970]
and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment)
after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." Id.
27. The Supreme Court has stated that while two racketeering acts are necessary,
they may not be sufficient to constitute a pattern. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S 479, 496 n.14. Indeed, two isolated acts do not constitute a pattern;
it is continuity and a relationship between the acts that produce a pattern. Id. (quoting
S. REP. No. 617; 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 6171).
The First, Fourth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits require a "pattern" to consist of
more than a single fraudulent scheme. See Madden v. Gluck, 815 F.2d 1163, 1164
(8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 86 (1987); Condict v. Condict, 815 F.2d 579,
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Civil RICO's treble-damages provision thus provides an enticing
remedy for commodity futures customers if the requisites of the
RICO cause of action 21 can be satisfied. Because civil RICO can
585 (10th Cir. 1987); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 1987);
International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 1987); Torwest
DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 928-29 (10th Cir. 1987); Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer,
785 F.2d 252, 257 (8th Cir. 1986). The First Circuit, although declining to classify
a "pattern" in terms of a scheme or episode, held that a single instance of bribery
committed through numerous predicate acts of mail and wire fraud "did not constitute
'a pattern of racketeering activity.' " Roeder, 814 F.2d at 31.
In contrast, the commission of two predicate acts within a single fraudulent scheme
may be sufficient in the Second, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. See Appley
v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1028 (7th Cir. 1987); Sun Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff,
825 F.2d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1987); Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820
F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1987); California Arch. Bldg. Prod., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics,
Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1469 & n.l (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 698 (1988);
United States v. lanniello, 808 F.2d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3229-30 (1987); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782
F.2d 966, 971 (lth Cir. 1986). The Seventh Circuit has stated that a pattern of
racketeering activity involves ongoing predicate acts over an identifiable period of time
which, although "adding up to coordinated action," Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v.
Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1987), remain "somewhat separated in time and
place." Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986). Yet, the
fact that one scheme or one victim is involved does not mean the related predicate
acts fail to satisfy the "pattern" requirement. Id. at 975-76; see Liquid Air Corp. v.
Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1304-05 (7th Cir. 1987).
The quantity and quality of acts sufficient to satisfy the "pattern" element, therefore,
vary from circuit to circuit. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently held that the
four-year limitations period of the Clayton Act applies to claims under civil RICO.
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2767 (1987).
28. Under § 1964(c) of RICO, the plaintiff must aver that he was injured in his
business or property by reason of the defendant's violation of § 1962. Moss v. Morgan
Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Moss v. Newman,
465 U.S. 1025 (1984); see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). The pleading requirements
under § 1962 depend upon which subsection the defendant has allegedly violated. For
purposes of this Note, the pertinent subsections shall be 1962(a) and 1962(c) because
the overwhelming majority of commodity-related RICO claims are brought under these
subsections. See supra note 25. These subsections state the following:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a
principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to
use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds
of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce. ...
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
19881
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be directed against "any person"2 9 who causes injury to a customer's
business or property,30 potential targets include those persons han-
dling a customer's commodity futures account:" futures commission
collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), 1962(c) (1982).
In Sedima, the Supreme Court summarized the above pleading requirements:
Section 1962 .. .makes it unlawful for "any person" . . . to use money
derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to invest in an enterprise,
... or to conduct an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity .... If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in
a manner forbidden by these provisions, and the racketeering activities injure
the plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim [for treble
damages] under § 1964(c).
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495; see, e.g., Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Sys. Corp., 576 F. Supp.
234, 242 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (§ 1962(a)); Alcorn County v. United States Interstate
Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1167-68 (5th Cir. 1984) (§ 1962(c)); Moss, 719 F.2d
at 17 (same).
29, See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
30, See RICO § 1964(c), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982); supra notes 14, 28 and
accompanying text. The business at stake in the customer's account may concern the
physical commodity interests of a hedger, and the property at stake could, of course,
be the money of the speculator. See supra note 5 for a description of these persons
and their interests in the commodity futures markets.
31. A customer generally establishes his commodity futures account with a futures
commission merchant (FCM). The term "futures commission merchant" includes the
following:
[I]ndividuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts engaged in
soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity
for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market and
that, in or in connection with such solicitation or acceptance of orders,
accepts any money, securities, or property (or extends any credit in lieu
thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result
or may result therefrom.
CEA § 2(a)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The FCM is the commodities market equivalent
of the securities market brokerage or wire house. 1 Russo, supra note 8, § 4.01, at
4-5. Not only is the FCM the liaison for customers-performing such services as
opening their accounts, accepting their orders, forwarding these orders to the floor
of the contract market for execution, confirming those executions, and accepting
margin money as required-the FCM is the salesman for the industry to attract those
customers. I JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 1.33, at 101. FCMs must be registered with
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). CEA § 4d(1), 7 U.S.C. § 6d(1)
(1982).
An FCM fulfills its liaison and salesman functions through its employees and agents.
I JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 1.33, at 101; 1 Russo, supra note 8, § 4.02, at 4-5. Such
employees and agents include associated persons, introducing brokers, commodity
trading advisors, commodity pool operators and floor brokers. All must be registered
with the CFTC. See CEA §§ 4d(l), 4e, 4k(1), 4m(1), 7 U.S.C. §§ 6d(1), 6e, 6k(1),
6m(l) (1982). The liability of FCMs for the acts of such employees and agents under
the CEA and RICO is discussed infra at notes 157-65, 221-353 and accompanying
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text, respectively.
An associated person (AP), known also as an account executive (AE), is someone
affiliated with an FCM "as a partner, officer, or employee ... in any capacity that
involves (i) the solicitation or acceptance of customers' orders (other than in a clerical
capacity) or (ii) the supervision of any person or persons so engaged ..... " CEA
§ 4k(l), 7 U.S.C. § 6k(l) (1982). Associated persons are the individuals who usually
solicit and deal directly with customers with respect to their accounts. 1 Russo, supra
note 8, § 4.02, at 4-5. Quite frequently, a customer's only direct contact with an
FCM is through its AP. I JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 1.43, at 117.
Introducing brokers (IBs) are individuals who solicit or accept customer orders, but,
unlike APs, do not accept customer monies to margin or secure those orders. CEA
§ 2(a)(l)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The function of an IB, formerly known as an
"agent of an FCM," remains unchanged: he solicits customers or accepts their orders,
or does both, on behalf of FCMs. See 1 Russo, supra note 8, § 4.03, at 4-6 to 4-
7.
A commodity trading advisor (CTA) is "any person who, for compensation or
profit, engages in the business of advising others ... as to the value of or the
advisability of trading" in the futures markets, with certain exceptions. CEA § 2(a)(l)(A),
7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Commodity trading advisors earn their livelihood by rendering
advice, including trading strategies and price predictions, to commodity customers. I
JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 1.53, at 132. A commodity pool operator (CPO) is a person
engaged in an investment trust, syndicate or similar type of business who solicits or
receives money, securities or property from others for the purpose of trading on the
commodity markets. CEA § 2(a)(l)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Commodity pools are
organizations that sell limited interests or shares to investors, raising capital to invest
wholly or partially in commodity markets. I JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 1.59, at 143.
A customer shares in any profits generated by the investments, but sustains losses
limited to his interest in the organization. See id.
The solicitation and acceptance of customer orders by FCMs through their agents
and employees would be of little value, however, if those orders were not executed
by certain dynamic individuals. See I JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 1.48, at 123. These
individuals, known as floor brokers, stand in the "ring" or "pit" of a contract market
(exchange) to purchase or sell futures contracts on behalf of others, subject to the
rules of the exchange. CEA § 2(a)(l)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Acting as agents for
FCMs in the execution of customers' orders, floor brokers endeavor to execute or
.fill those orders in the terms and in accordance with the policies of the FCM from
which the orders came. I JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 1.48, at 123. Floor brokers, as
do FCMs and certain of their agents and employees, earn income from customers,
by charging fees (brokerage) for each contract executed for customers' accounts. I
JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 1.48, at 123.
It is not always clear, however, whether a futures industry professional is acting
as an FCM's agent to subject the FCM to liability under the CEA, and possibly
RICO. An agent is a person authorized by another to act for him. See H. RuscHLEIN
& W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 7, at 14
(1979) [hereinafter REUSCmLEiN & GREGORY]. The CFTC has set forth the following
guidelines to decipher whether any or all of the above industry professionals are acting
as an agent for an FCM:
With regard to agency, there must obviously be some connection (disclosed
or undisclosed) between the alleged principal [FCM] and the purported
agent. Evidence might exist showing, for example, that the agent is the
employee of the principal; that the principal has referred to the individual
as its agent; that the principal has knowingly allowed the individual to
represent himself to third parties as an agent of the principal; that the
principal has a mutually beneficial business arrangement with the agent
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whereby each solicits business for the other; or that the principal's employees
work hand in hand or out of the same office as does its alleged agent ...
Lobb v. J.T. McKerr & Co., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
23,424, at 33,119 (CFTC Dec. 30, 1986) (quoting Goldstein v. James T. McKerr
& Co., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,590, at 30,538
(CFTC Apr. 12, 1985)).
Thus, commission-sharing arrangements may establish an agency between FCMs
and CTAs. Embeita v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,594, at 30,553 (E.D. Va. 1985) (WESTLAW, DCT database);
Berisko v. Eastern Capital Corp., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 22,274, at 29,401-02 (CFTC June 27, 1984), modified and aff'd, [1984-1986
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,772, at 31,224 (CFTC Oct. 1,
1985). A CPO's placement of trades exclusively with one FCM may also imply a
principal-agent relationship. See Lobb, 23,424, at 33,119. Pursuant to CFTC Reg.
§ 1.10(j), FCMs may enter into guarantee agreements with IBs, see 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.10(j) (1987), whereby the FCM "guarantees performance by the [IB] of, and is
jointly and severally liable for, all obligations of the [IB]. . . ." CFTC Intp. Ltr. No.
84-26, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,472, at 30,098
(CFTC Dec. 6, 1984). A specific agreement between an IB and FCM, therefore, may
make the former an agent of the latter. See Bogard v. Abraham-Rietz & Co., [1984-
1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,273, at 29,393-94 (CFTC
July 5, 1984). An agency relationship may be found, moreover, although the customer
has signed an agreement disclaiming that any such relationship between the FCM and
industry professional exists. See Embeita, 22,594, at 30,552; Berisko, 22,274, at
29,401. In short, any person performing for, or a duty of, an FCM may be considered
that FCM's agent. See In re Buckwalter, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 22,782, at 31,269 (CFTC Sept. 27, 1985), appeal dismissed, [1986-
1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,375, at 33,033 (CFTC Dec.
2, 1986).
• Agency is a fiduciary relationship that results from (1) a manifestation of consent
by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, and (2) consent by the other to so act. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY
§ 1(1) (1957) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; REuscH.EN & GREGORY, supra,
§ 12, at 31; see Berisko, 22,274, at 29,401. A fiduciary relationship arises whenever
confidence is reposed by one person in another, obliging the other to act for the
benefit of that person. See REUSCHLEiN & GREGORY, supra, § 67, at 121. These
concepts produce a concise portrait of the usual FCM-customer relationship:
A person wishing to trade on the contract markets will open an account
at an FCM and will rely upon the FCM to attend to the account's needs.
Trading orders are given by the customer to the FCM, margins and money
balances of the customer are controlled there, and records and reports on
trading activity are generated by the FCM for the customer's benefit.
I JOHNSON, supra note 1, § 1.33, at 101 (emphasis added). "To be sure, the.FCM
is indeed an agent of the [customer] and owes him, accordingly, a fiduciary duty."
Fustok v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc. 618 F. Supp. 1082, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(quoting Sherman v. Sokoloff, 570 F. Supp. 1266, 1269 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)); see
Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,981 (CFTC Apr. 10, 1980), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc. v. CIFTC, 673 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1982); 1 Russo,
supra note 8, § 12.37 at 12-72. But cf Horn v. Ray E. Friedman & Co., 776 F.2d
777, 780 (8th Cir. 1985) (employment of broker by FCM did not create fiduciary
relationship between them when no fiduciary relationship would exist between FCM
and similarly situated customers).
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Industry professionals, consisting in large part of the aforementioned employees and
agents of FCMs, who establish a principal-agent relationship with their customers also
owe their customers a fiduciary duty. Gordon, 21,016, at 23,981. Recognizing that
the contours of this duty are defined by the way in which the professional acts, the
CFTC has stated that those professionals who play an advisory role assume a broader
duty. Id. The role that the industry professional assumes can be measured by the
degree of control, implicit or explicit, that he exerts over the customer's account. See
1 Russo, supra note 8, §§ 12.34-12.35, at 12-65 to 12-66. Factors that suggest implicit
control are (1) a customer's lack of sophistication regarding commodity futures; (2)
his lack of trading experience; (3) a small amount of time devoted by the customer
to his account; (4) significant trust or confidence reposed by the customer in the
professional; (5) trades executed upon the advice of the professional or (6) the absence
of prior customer approval for trades executed on his behalf. Smith v. Siegel Trading
Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,105, at 24,454
(CFTC Sept. 3, 1980). An industry professional's explicit control over a customer's
account, in which the customer has given the professional written discretion to trade
on the customer's behalf, is generally known as a discretionary account. See 1 Russo,
supra note 8, § 4.20, at 4-32 to 4-33; see also CFTC Reg. § 166.2, 17 C.F.R. § 166.2
(1987) (defining discretionary account). In other words, trades may be effected by the
professional for the customer without his express prior approval. II JoHNsoN', supra
note 1, § 5.45, at 333. Given the volatile nature of the commodity futures markets,
many customers routinely open discretionary accounts with FCMs or those acting on
their behalf. Id.
Under the Commodity Exchange Act, a paramount duty imposed upon FCMs is
the preservation and protection of its customers' funds against losses resulting from
improper handling or mismanagement, especially by its agents or employees. See 1
Russo, supra note 8, § 4.22, at 4-37; see also CFTC v. Commodity Fluctuations Sys.,
Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,654, at 30,764
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (WESTLAW, DCT database) (FCM's duty to supervise activities of
its agents included obligations to oversee agents' probable activity and to investigate
customer complaints even after agency terminated). To help assure that FCMs fulfill
this fiduciary duty, the CFTC has promulgated several regulations. See I JoHNsoN,
supra note 1, § 1.37, at 106. When an FCM receives a customer's order to purchase
or sell contracts, a written record must be prepared immediately. CFTC Reg. § 1.35(a-
1)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(a-1)(1) (1987). The same procedure applies when a customer's
order is directly received by an FCM's agent on the floor of an exchange. See CFTC
Reg. § 1.35(a-1)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(a-1)(2) (1987).
CFTC Reg. § 155.3 requires an FCM to insure that customer orders "executable
at or near the [current] market price" be so executed before orders for the same
commodity futures contract are executed on behalf of the FCM or any affiliated
person. 17 C.F.R. § 155.3(a) (1987). CFTC Reg. § 155.3 also prohibits FCMs and
their affiliated persons, which includes employees, see CFTC Reg. § 155.1, 17 C.F.R.
§ 155.1 (1987), from unnecessarily disclosing information regarding customers' orders.
See 17 C.F.R. § 155.3(b)(1) (1987). Its purpose is to restrict FCMs and their affiliated
persons or others from using such information for their personal advantage. 1 Russo,
supra note 8, § 4.18, at 4-29 to 4-30. Once a customer's order is executed or filled
in the "ring" of the contract market, a written confirmation of the transaction must
be furnished to the customer. CFTC Reg. § 1.33(b), 17 C.F.R. § 1.33(b) (1987).
Absent specific instructions from the customer to the contrary, CFTC Reg. § 1.46(b)
requires an FCM to apply a customer order that will liquidate or close out the
customer's position in the market against the oldest open position of the customer.
17 C.F.R. § 1.46(b) (1987). FCMs must also furnish their customers with monthly
19881
84 FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
merchants (FCMs) .32
Although Congress originally intended RICO to deter the infil-
tration of organized crime into legitimate businesses," plaintiffs
utilize the Act's treble-damages remedy against legitimate businesses
as well.34 Indeed, civil RICO's use against "legitimate" defendants
far eclipses its use against organized criminals." Courts continue
to struggle to interpret the broad language of RICO36 and Congress
itself is presently considering three bills to amend the statute. 37
account statements delineating the trading activity in their accounts for the previous
month. CFTC Reg. § 1.33(a), 17 C.F.R. § 1.33(a) (1987).
The FCM's duties under the foregoing regulations and under the CEA are amplified
by both another section of the Act and a CFTC regulation. Section 2(a)(1)(A) of the
CEA makes an FCM strictly liable for the acts and omissions of its employees and
agents. See 7 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). See infra notes 157-65 and accompanying text for
a discussion of this section. CFTC Reg. § 166.3 requires an FCM to diligently supervise
the handling of all commodity accounts "carried, operated, advised or introduced"
by it or its employees and agents, as well as "all other activities of its partners,
officers, employees and agents" relating to its business. 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (1987);
see Fluctuations Sys., 22,654, at 30,764 n.3.
Thus the FCM-customer relationship generally entails fiduciary duties which the
FCM owes its customers. See 1 Russo, supra note 8, § 12.34, at 12-65. The FCM
is obligated to utilize its customer's account for his benefit and not its own, see
Smith, 21,105, at 24,453, and to avoid any action or inaction which defrauds the
customer or fails to meet the fiduciary obligations owed to him. See 1 Russo, supra
note 8, § 4.02, at 4-5 to 4-6. In sum, "a futures commission merchant, through its
associated persons and other agents, engages for pay in the solicitation and acceptance
of customers' orders, in the handling of customers' funds, or in the furnishing of
trading advice, and thereby is placed in a position of trust and confidence vis-a-vis
its customers. " Gordon, 21,016, at 23,976 n. 16 (emphasis added). The CEA recognizes
this fiduciary relationship and provides against violations thereof. Id. at 23,976 (quoting
In re Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 103 F.2d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 1939)).
32. See supra note 31 for a definition and discussion of this term.
33. See infra notes 46-58, 75 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 50-58, 166-220, 251-52 and accompanying text; see also Sedima,
S.P. R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (instead of being used against
organized criminals, RICO is being applied in everyday fraud cases against respected,
legitimate businesses).
35. See Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law 55-56 (1985), cited in Sedima, 473 U.S. at
499 n. 16.
36. See infra notes 50-76, 166-220 and accompanying text.
37. Congress has not yet acted upon the three bills, which were introduced in
mid-1987. Two bills propose to restrict the use of RICO against legitimate businesses.
See S. 1523, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter S. 1523]; H.R. 2983, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter H.R. 2983]. Although these bills generally rule
out recovery under RICO if either federal or state securities laws provide an express
or implied remedy, neither bill forbids recovery for commodities-related infractions.
See S. 1523, supra, at 5-6; H.R. 2983, supra, at 6. The third bill would actually
broaden the scope of civil RICO, see H.R. 3240, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), adding
activities indictable under the Commodity Exchange Act to RICO's list of prohibited
activity. See id. at 5.
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Two questions that the courts have yet to resolve are whether,
for purposes of section 1962(a) of RICO,3" the same entity can
serve as both the culpable "person" 3 9 and the "enterprise ' 40 and
if so, whether that entity can be held liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior 4l for the misconduct of its employees or agents
acting within the scope of their employment.
This Note considers whether a futures commission merchant may
incur civil RICO liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior
for the acts of its agents or employees. 42 Part II examines the
legislative and judicial development of RICO and discusses the
history and regulatory framework of the CEA. Part III discusses
the respondeat superior doctrine under the CEA, which imposes
strict liability upon FCMs for their agents' activities, and analyzes
the doctrine's potential application under RICO. Part IV of this
Note concludes that in most circumstances, an FCM should be held
liable under civil RICO for the acts of its agents and employees
unless Congress itself determines otherwise.
II. Legislative and Judicial Development of RICO and the CEA
The Supreme Court has consistently stated that a statute should
be interpreted according to its plainlanguage absent "clear evidence"
of a contrary legislative intent.43 The words of a statute must first
be consulted-if the language is unambiguous, "that language must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive" absent a "clearly expressed
legislative intent to the contrary." 44 According to the Court, more-
38. See supra notes 18, 28 and accompanying text; infra notes 239-312 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this section.
39. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; infra note 168 and accompanying
text for a definition of this term.
40. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; infra note 169 and accompanying
text for a definition of this term.
41. This doctrine, which means "let the master answer," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1179 (5th ed. 1979), holds that an employer is liable in certain instances for the
wrongful actions of his employee occurring in the course of employment. See W.
KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWENS, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 69, at 499-500 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; REuSCILEIN
& GREGORY, supra note 31, § 52, at 101. See infra notes 126-56 and accompanying
text for a general discussion of the respondeat superior doctrine.
42. See supra note 31 for a description of. FCMs' agents and employees.
43. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 121 (1980); see Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980) (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337
(1979)).
44. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (quoting Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)), quoted in Russello
v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983).
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over, the plain language of a statute is the most reliable evidence
of Congress' intended meaning. 45
A. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
The primary purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970,46 title IX of which is RICO, 47 was to eradicate organized
crime in the United States "by strengthening the legal tools in the
evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions,
and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with
the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.' '48 RICO
focused on eliminating the infiltration of organized crime into le-
gitimate commercial organizations. 49 In an apparent effort to restrict
the use of RICO against non-racketeer defendants, lower federal
courts have imposed limitations which circumscribe the potential
defendant and plaintiff classes50 under the Act."
45. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 593.
46. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended in various
sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
47. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
48. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923
(1970) (Statements of Findings and Purpose); see Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591.
49. See S. REP. No. 617, supra note 27, at 76; see also 116 CONG. REc. 591
(1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("title IX is aimed at removing organized crime
from our legitimate [business] organizations"); id. at 602 (remarks of Sen. Yarborough)
("a full-scale attack on organized crime").
50. The primary constriction of the defendant class resulted from the requirement
that a RICO defendant be somehow linked to organized crime. See Divco Constr. &
Realty Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 712, 714-
15 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D.
Cal. 1983); Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Decisions
requiring a connection to organized crime are inconsistent with Sedima, in which the
Supreme Court expressly rejected a "racketeering" requirement. 473 U.S. at 494-95.
The Court also rejected the Second Circuit's holding that civil RICO actions could
be maintained only against persons who had been convicted either under RICO itself
or of a predicate act listed in § 1961(1) of the statute. See id. at 488-89, 493.
The primary judicial restrictions imposed on plaintiffs have generally concerned the
nature of the plaintiff's injury. Some courts required the plaintiff to allege "competitive"
injury to his business or property, see Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 761
(N.D. Cal. 1983); Banker's Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d
511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 473 U.S. 922 (1985); Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp.
210, 218 (D. Colo. 1983); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp.
207, 210-11 (N.D. Ill. 1980), or "racketeering injury" which is "different than injury
from [the] predicate acts." Landmark Say. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206,
208 (E.D. Mich. 1981); see Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 516; Willamette Say. & Loan
v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1429 (D. Or. 1984); Richardson v.
Shearson/American Express Co., 573 F. Supp. 133, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also
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Before the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co.,52 for example, many courts required an allegation that a de-
Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 & n.1l (D.
Mass. 1982) ("racketeering enterprise injury" resulting in commercial harm). Relying
on its opinion in Sedima, in which the Supreme Court rejected the above limitations,
473 U.S. at 494-95, the Court has stated that requiring a civil RICO plaintiff to
prove injury from conduct other than the predicate acts "suffers from the same defects
as the amorphous and unfounded restrictions on the RICO private action we rejected
in that case." American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606, 609
(1985) (per curiam).
Despite the Supreme Court's express rejection of such restrictions, certain federal
courts still impose analogous limitations under § 1962(a) of RICO: plaintiffs must
show they were injured by reason of the defendant's investment or use of racketeering
proceeds in the enterprise. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipeline Co.,
642 F. Supp. 781, 805 n.21 (E.D. La. 1986); see Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Sec.,
Inc., 643 F. Supp. 107, 109, 111 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Heritage Ins. Co. of Am. v. First
Nat. Bank, 629 F. Supp. 1412, 1417 (N.D. Il. 1986); DeMuro v. E.F. Hutton, 643
F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). These courts worry that to hold that trading
commissions used to finance the operation of a defendant-enterprise are sufficient to
state a cause of action under § 1962(a) "would turn every churning case into a RICO
case." DeMuro, 643 F. Supp. at 67. Such courts go to great lengths to prevent "a
vast and unwarranted extension of the boundaries of civil RICO." Id.
Other courts, following the lead of the Supreme Court, have rightly recognized that
if a plaintiff must show damages by a defendant's use or investment of racketeering
proceeds, he "will almost never prove a claim against a corporate defendant under
section 1962(a)." Louisiana Power, 642 F. Supp. at 806. These courts, therefore, do
not require the additional averment of injury by a defendant's investment of racketeering
income. See id. at 807; see also Roche v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 658 F. Supp. 315,
321 (M.D. Pa. 1986); B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright Ref. Co., 617 F. Supp. 49, 52
(D.N.J. 1985). Indeed, the Supreme Court has already determined that a complaint
under RICO is not deficient for failing to allege an "injury separate from the financial
loss stemming from the alleged acts of mail and wire fraud .. " Sedima, 473 U.S.
at 500. "Damages that 'flow from the commission of the predicate acts,' " therefore,
are recoverable. Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497). Mail and wire fraud, of course, are the predicate acts for
commodity-related RICO actions. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text. A
RICO claim for damages to a corporation, however, may only be sought by the
corporation or its shareholders in the name and on behalf of the corporation. Roeder,
814 F.2d at 29; Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 579 (1986); Warren v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 759 F.2d 542,
544 (6th Cir. 1985). Shareholders may not bring RICO derivative actions on their
own behalf. See Roeder, 824 F.2d at 30; Rand, 794 F.2d at 849; Warren, 759 F.2d
at 644-45.
51. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. See generally Abrams, The Place
of Procedural Control in Determining Who May Sue or Be Sued: Lessons in Statutory
Interpretation from Civil RICO and Sedima, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1477, 1506-24 (1985);
Moran, Pleading a Civil RICO Action Under Section 1962(c): Conflicting Precedent
and the Practitioner's Dilemma, 57 TEmp. L.Q. 731, 746-67 (1984) [hereinafter Moran];
Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Actions in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg,
58 Nom DAME L. REa. 237, 280-341 (1982) [hereinafter Blakey]. A more recent
restriction on the scope of civil RICO, the "pattern" requirement, is still evolving.
See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text; infra note 65 and accompanying text.
52. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
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fendant have some connection with organized crime. 3 Congress
realized, however, that "the concept of organized criminal activity
is broader in scope than the concept of organized crime," '' and
hence understood that it could not draw an "effective" statute
which would reach most commercial activities of organized crime
and "not include offenses commonly committed by persons outside
organized crime as well." 55 Courts and commentators thus recognize
that it is a defendant's conduct in violation of the Act, and not
his status, which subjects him to liability under RICO.5 6 In short,
Congress was well aware that although the predicate offenses listed
in RICO5 7 lend themselves to organized commercial exploitation,
such offenses are merely characteristic of, and are not committed
exclusively by, organized crime members. 8
53. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. The imposition of an organized-
crime restriction to limit the defendant class reflects the reluctance of many courts
to allow what is essentially a "racketeering" statute to be used against "legitimate"
businesses. See id. As Senator John McClellan, a sponsor and major force behind
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, remarked:
The curious objection has been raised ... to several of its provisions in
particular, that they are not somehow limited to organized crime itself, as
if organized crime were a precise and operative legal concept, like murder,
rape, or robbery. Actually, of course, it is a functional concept like "white
collar crime," serving simply as a shorthand method of referring to a large
and varying group of criminal offenses committed in diverse circumstances.
McClellan, The Organized Crime Control Act (S. 30) or its Critics: Which Threatens
Civil Liberties?, 46 NonTE DAME L. REv. 55, 60-61 (1970) [hereinafter McClellan];
see 116 CONG. REc. 18,913 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
Thus, an amendment to the RICO bill that would have criminalized membership
in the "Mafia" or "La Cosa Nostra," 116 CONG. REc. 35,343 (1970) (remarks of
Rep. Biaggi), was rejected on constitutional (organizational status) and practical (ev-
identiary) grounds. See id. at 35,344 (remarks of Rep. Poff).
54. 116 CONG. Rac. 3.5,293 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff).
55. Id. at 18,940 (remarks of Sen. McClellan). On its face, RICO neither mentions
nor requires any connection with organized crime. In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388,
1428 (E.D. Pa. 1984). It applies to and can be used by "any person." See RICO
§§ 1962, 1964(c), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(c) (1982); see also Sedima, 473 U.S. at
495 (§ 1964(c) authorizes a private suit by "any person"; § 1962 makes it unlawful
for "any person"-not just mobsters-to engage in the section's proscribed activities).
See supra notes 14, 28 for text of applicable RICO sections.
56. Lode v. Leonardo, 557 F. Supp. 675, 680 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see United States
v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977); Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp.
714, 719 (D.D.C. 1983); Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1578-79 (E.D. Mich.
1983); McClellan, supra note 53, at 62, 144; see also Catanella, 583 F. Supp. at 1429
(instead of outlawing actors, Congress outlawed acts); Blakey, supra note 51, at 284-
85 (court refusing to interpret RICO as creating status offense relied in part on
"unanimous opinion of the commentators").
57. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; infra notes 59-61 and accompanying
text.
58. McClellan, supra note 53, at 142.
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It is upon this list of predicate offenses that the courts have
mantled a second limitation which is based upon the concept of
federalism. Section 1961(1) of RICO defines "racketeering activity"
as any act which is indictable under certain enumerated sections of
title 18 of the United States Code,5 9 including mail fraud60 and wire
fraud. 61 Because virtually all federal courts have refused to recognize
an implied private right of action under the mail and wire fraud
statutes, 62 defrauded plaintiffs must pursue their common law fraud
claims in state courts. 63 Many judges believe that the increasing
reliance on the mails and wires in everyday commercial activities,
in conjunction with the appeal of RICO's treble-damages provision,64
and the relative ease of satisfying the Act's "pattern of racketeering"
requirement 65 threatens to federalize these common law fraud claims
formerly heard in state courts.
66
In an effort to stem this tide of "garden variety" fraud brought
before them, federal courts have blocked plaintiffs' efforts by im-
posing additional requirements not found in the Act.67 The language
59. See RICO § 1961(1), 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. IV 1986); supra note 19
and accompanying text.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text for
a description of this fraud.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982). See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text for
a description of this fraud.
62. Note, Civil Rico: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95
HARV. L. REv. 1101, 1104 (1982) [hereinafter Civil Rico]; see Ryan v. Ohio Edison
Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 1177-79 (6th Cir. 1979); Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342,
346 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 501 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (courts
of appeals have consistently held that no implied federal cause of action accrues to
victims under mail and wire fraud statutes).
63. Civil Rico, supra note 62, at 1104.
64. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 26-28; see also Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am.,
824 F.2d 1349, 1353 (3d Cir. 1987) ("a number of courts have begun to use the
pattern requirement to prevent RICO from reaching 'legitimate business' ").
66. Civil Rico, supra note 62, at 1105; see Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 386-87 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd per curiam, 473 U.S. 606
(1985); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1064 (8th Cir. 1982), modified on other
grounds, 710 F.2d 1361 (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Bennett, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); Ghouth v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 642 F. Supp.
1325, 1334 n.10 (N.D. Ill. 1986); see also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 501 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (majority's interpretation of RICO federalizes broad areas of state common
law frauds); cf Exeter Towers Assocs. v. Bowditch, 604 F. Supp. 1547, 1554 (D.
Mass. 1985) ("[m]ost substantial business transactions involve two or more uses of
the mail .... To hold that two such uses of the mail ... are sufficient ... would
be to sweep into federal courts, under RICO, the great majority of actions for fraud
in commercial transactions").
67. See Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 493 n.21 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see
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of the Act and its legislative history, however, display Congress'
awareness that it was ushering in a new era of federal participation
in an area previously dominated by the states.6 Congress included
within the definition of "racketeering activity" a number of "state"
crimes69 because it perceived existing federal and state law to be
inadequate; hence, RICO criminalized conduct that was already
addressed by state law. 70 Congress wanted a spearhead to attack
the source of organized crime's economic power "on all available
fronts." 7 ' The Act was enacted, therefore, despite concern that it
would place into federal hands substantive areas of law formerly
left to the states for adjudication. 72
The implications of RICO are thus dramatic, substantially af-
fecting federal and state efforts to redress illegal conduct. 73 Ad-
ditionally, Congress expressly directed that the provisions of RICO
"be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." ' 74 Be-
cause both the plain language and the legislative history of the Act
also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500 (inappropriate for courts to impose amorphous standing
requirements to amend statute). See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text for the
types of judicial barriers.
68. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586-87. Congress expressly stated that nothing in title
IX (RICO) "shall supersede any provision of Federal, State, or other law imposing
criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for in this
title." Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 904(b), 84 Stat.
922, 947 (1970). Indeed, state offenses are included in RICO's definition of "racketeering
activity" by "generic designation." H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADrnmN. NEWS 4007, 4032. Such offenses, then,
may also cause a violation of RICO. See Forsythe, 560 F.2d at 1137; see also United
States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1164-65 n.4 (state offenses incorporated into federal
racketeering and gambling statutes), cert. denied sub nom. Mazzuca v. United States,
452 U.S. 905 (1981).
69. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586; see RICO § 1961(1), 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp.
IV 1986).
70. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586; see Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
71. Russello, 464 U.S. at 27 (quoting S. REP. No. 617, supra note 27, at 79).
72. See 116 CONG. REC. 35,217 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt); supra notes
62-66 and accompanying text.
73. Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1353. As one court astutely noted:
Congress deliberately cast the net of liability wide, being more concerned
to avoid opening loopholes through which the minions of organized crime
might crawl to freedom than to avoid making garden-variety frauds ac-
tionable in federal treble damage proceedings-the price of eliminating all
possible loopholes.
Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984).
74. Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
922, 947 (1970). The Supreme Court, stating "RICO is to be read broadly," stressed
that the liberal construction clause applies to civil RICO as well. Sedima, 473 U.S.
at 497-98.
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demonstrate Congress' deliberate resolve to enact a broad statute,75
at least some courts have recognized that the judiciary should refrain
from exercising the legislative function of redrafting a deliberately
broad statute. 76
B. The History and Regulatory Framework of the Commodity
Exchange Act
The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)77 has been amended seven
times within the past sixty-five years. 78 Recognizing the benefits 79
and potential hazards8° inherent in futures trading, Congress has
engaged in a progressive course of regulation. 8' Indeed, this reg-
75. As Senator John McClellan, a principal sponsor of the Organized Crime Control
Act, stated:
[It] was a bill which was carefully drafted... to broaden federal jurisdiction
over ... corruption where interstate commerce is affected, to attack and
mitigate the effects of racketeer infiltration of legitimate organizations af-
fecting interstate commerce ...
[Its] passage ... was the culmination of a year of detailed study, hearings,
and consultations, and the result of one of the most thoroughly gratifying
bipartisan efforts in which I have participated since coming to the Senate.
McClellan, supra note 53, at 57 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
76. Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1361; see Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
567 F. Supp. 1231, 1239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Kimmel, 565 F. Supp. at 493 n.21; see
also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499-500 (inappropriate for judiciary to limit RICO's private
action; such duty "must lie with Congress").
77. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
78. See Futures Trading Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-641, 100 Stat. 3556; Futures
Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294; Futures Trading Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865; Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act (CFTC Act) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389; Act of Feb. 19, 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-258, 82 Stat. 26; Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491
(1936) (giving the Act its present name); Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998
(1922) (upheld in Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923)); Future Trading Act,
ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921) (declared unconstitutional in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S.
44 (1922)).
This history excludes the inclusion and subsequent prohibition of trading in onion
futures. See Stassen, The Commodity Exchange Act in Perspective: A Short and Not-
So-Reverent History of Futures Trading Legislation in the United States, 39 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 825, 832 (1982) [hereinafter Stassen]; see also supra note 1 (onions
excluded from definition of "commodity"). See In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941 (CFTC Dec. 6, 1979) for an account
of the early history of the CEA.
79. See supra note 5; infra notes 122-25 for a summary of the "benefits."
80. See supra note 8 for a summary of the "hazards."
81. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 360
(1982). More than a decade prior to federal regulation of the commodity futures
markets, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of agreements made by participants
at the Chicago Board of Trade based primarily on their attempt to forecast the future.
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ulation reflects Congress' awareness that transactions in commodity
futures conducted on boards of trade or exchanges directly affect
the "national public interest. -82
Perhaps the most significant amendment to the CEA was the
inclusion of section 4b, the "anti-fraud" provision, in 1936.83 Section
4b prohibits any member of a contract market,14 or any agent or
employee of any member, from defrauding any other person in
connection with any order to make, or the execution of, any futures
contract." The purpose of section 4b is to protect the investing
public against fraud and conversion from contract market members
and their agents purportedly acting on the investor's behalf.1
6
See Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1905).
Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes stated that the value of speculation of this
kind is "well known as a means of avoiding or mitigating catastrophes, equalizing
prices and providing for [commodities in] periods of want." Id. at 247.
82. See Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, § 3, 42 Stat. 998, 999 (1922) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1982)). Congress concluded:
Such futures transactions are carried on in large volume by the public
generally and by persons engaged in the business of buying and selling
commodities and the products and byproducts thereof in interstate commerce.
The prices involved in such transactions are generally quoted and dissem-
inated throughout the United States ... as a basis for determining the
prices to the producer and the consumer of commodities ... and to facilitate
movements thereof in interstate commerce. Such transactions are utilized
by shippers, dealers, millers, and others engaged in handling commodities
... as a means of hedging themselves against possible loss through fluc-
tuations in price. The transactions and prices of commodities on such boards
of trade are susceptible to excessive speculation and can be manipulated
... to the detriment of the producer or the consumer and the persons
handling commodities ... in interstate commerce, rendering regulation
imperative for the protection of such commerce and the national public
interest therein.
Id. (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1982)).
83. Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, § 5, 49 Stat. 1491, 1493 (1936) (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982)). See supra note 8 which sets forth the pertinent
provisions of § 4b of the CEA.
84. The CEA makes it unlawful for any person to deal in futures contracts off
designated contract markets (exchanges). Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, § 4, 42 Stat.
998, 999-1000 (1922) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982)); see Leist v.
Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 293 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). See supra note 2 for an
explanation of the term "designated contract market." An exchange will not recognize
or enforce futures contracts unless both parties thereto are members of the exchange.
See, e.g., New York Cotton Exchange By-Law § 6.02 (33d ed. 1984) (as amended
through July, 1986). Members include, of course, FCMs and their agents discussed
supra at note 31.
85. CEA § 4b, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982); see Curran, 456 U.S. at 362.
86. See Stassen, supra note 78, at 832. Congress stated that the CEA's "fundamental
purpose" was to ensure fair and honest practices in the conduct of these important
[Vol. XVI
19881 FCMs AND CIVIL RICO
Other important changes in the CEA include the 1968 amendments 7
which extended coverage of the Act to include commodities other
than grains"8 and strengthened enforcement of the Act's provisions. 9
Criminal penalties for market manipulation90 and for embezzlement
of customer funds by FCMs were also increased. 9'
In 1974, Congress enacted the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission Act (CFTC Act). 92 Although the value of futures trading
had reached a level of over $500 billion per year, 93 many large and
important futures markets such as coffee, sugar, cocoa and silver
remained unregulated by the federal government until the passage
of the CFTC Act. 94 Most significantly, the CFTC Act established
a federal Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or Com-
mission) vested with "exclusive jurisdiction" over all futures trans-
actions traded or executed on designated contract markets. 95
Moreover, the definition of "commodity" was altered to cover
public markets, thereby acknowledging the interests of "that class of citizens who
have a fondness, and perhaps some aptitude, for speculative investments in com-
modities .... " H.R. REP. No. 421, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1936).
87. Act of Feb. 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-258, 82 Stat. 26.
88. See id. § l(a) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)). For example,
livestock and livestock products were added. See id.
89. See Curran, 456 U.S. at 364. Contract markets or exchanges, for example,
were required to enforce their rules. See Act of Feb. 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-258,
§ 12(c), 82 Stat. 26, 29 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7a(8) (1982)). Moreover,
the Secretary of Agriculture could now suspend, or issue cease and desist orders
against, exchanges that were not enforcing their rules or were otherwise violating the
CEA. See id. §§ 15, 18, 82 Stat. 26, 30-32 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 8(a), 13a (1982)); Curran, 456 U.S. at 364-65. New § 13(a) also established aiding
and abetting liability in administrative disciplinary proceedings. Act of Feb. 19, 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-258, § 26, 82 Stat. 26, 34 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 13c(a)
(1982)); see Markham & Meltzer, Secondary Liability Under the Commodity Exchange
Act-Respondeat Superior, Aiding and Abetting, Supervision, and Scienter, 27 EMORY
L.J. 1115, 1147 (1978) [hereinafter Markham & Meltzer].
90. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
91. See Act of Feb. 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-258, § 25, 82 Stat. 26, 33-34
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)-(b) (1982)). Moreover, it became unlawful
for any person (including an FCM) that received any money for deposit in a separate
account to use or treat that money as belonging to the FCM or a person other than
the customer who deposited the money. See id. § 6(b), 82 Stat. 26, 28 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6d(2) (1982)).
92. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974).
93. S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMN. NEWS 2087, 2097.
94. Id.
95. CFTC Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, §§ 101(a)(3), 201(b), 88 Stat. 1389,
1395 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4a(a)(1) (1982)); see Stassen, supra note
78, at 833-34.
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almost any good-not just agricultural commodities-which was or
could potentially be the subject of futures trading. 96
In addition to retaining the prior statutory prohibitions against
fraudulent practices and price manipulation, the CFTC Act added
new remedial sections. 97 For example, section 5a(ll) required con-
tract markets to provide arbitration procedures for the settlement
of customer grievances and claims not exceeding $15,000.9 Section
14 empowered the Commission to grant reparations proceedings to
any customer alleging damages from a contract market member's
violations of the CEA, or any rule, regulation or order issued
thereunder by the Commission.99 In short, the focus of the 1974
amendments to the CEA were twofold: to protect any individual
who desires to participate in the futures markets'0° and to develop
a strong regulatory scheme that would protect customers and con-
sumers. o'
Amendments in 1978102 further strengthened the regulatory scheme
of the CEA by increasing the monetary penalties for violations of
the Act'03 and by authorizing states to bring parens patriae actions'04
on behalf of citizens.10 5
96. CFTC Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 201(b), 88 Stat. 1389, 1395 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)); see Stassen, supra note 78, at 833-34. See supra
note 1 for an excerpt from this section of the CEA.
97. Curran, 456 U.S. at 366-67.
98. CFTC Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 209, 88 Stat. 1389, 1401 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7a(1l) (1982)). See infra note 316 and accompanying text
for a brief discussion of this section of the CEA.
99. CFTC Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 106, 88 Stat. 1389, 1393-95 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1982)); see Curran, 456 U.S. at 366. See infra note
317 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of this section of the CEA. A
subsequent conflict now rendered moot by the 1982 amendments, discussed infra at
notes 110-20 and accompanying text, arose concerning whether the new arbitration
and reparation procedures authorized by the CFTC Act became the sole methods of
recourse for complaints arising under the CEA. See Leist, 638 F.2d at 313. In other
words, were the new procedures exclusive of or in addition to the perceived existing
remedy of an implied private right of action? Id. See infra notes 106-09 and accom-
panying text for the Supreme Court's conclusion before the 1982 amendments.
100. 120 CONG. REc. 30,466 (1974) (statement of Sen. Dole). Indeed, the concern
to protect the commodity futures customer-hedger and speculator alike-permeated
the 1974 amendments. Leist, 638 F.2d at 305.
101. 120 CoNo. lnc. 34,996 (1974) (statement of Sen. Talmadge).
102. Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865.
103. See id. § 19, 92 Stat. 865, 875 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 13 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986)).
104. See id. § 15, 92 Stat. 865, 872 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2(i)
(1982)). Parens patriae refers to the authority of state attorneys general to commence
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In 1982, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,"°6
the Supreme Court held that an implied private right of action lies
for injuries caused by certain violations of the CEA. 0 7 According
to the pattern established by prior amendments to the CEA, the
Court concluded that Congress bolstered federal regulation108 to
maintain the integrity of, and to protect persons participating in,
the futures markets.10 9
lawsuits on behalf of state residents. See Lower, State Enforcement of the Commodity
Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1059, 1061 (1978).
105. Curran, 456 U.S. at 366; see, e.g., Kelley v. Carr, 442 F. Supp. 346, 348
(W.D. Mich. 1977) (state attorney general initiated action against FCM and CTA for
violations of CEA and state laws).
106. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
107. Id. at 390-95.
108. Id. at 394. The Supreme Court recognized that because the amendments to
the Commodity Exchange Act have consistently strengthened the federal regulatory
scheme, the elimination of the implied private action, a significant enforcement in-
strument, would "clash" with this legislative pattern. Id.
109. Id. at 389-90. The touchstone of the Supreme Court's conclusion was the
"savings clause" added to § 2 of the CEA by the CFTC Act of 1974. See id. at
386. Although § 2 of the CEA confers exclusive jurisdiction on the CFTC with respect
to transactions in commodity futures, see CEA § 2(a)(l)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982),
the savings clause provides that "[njothing in this section shall supersede or limit the
jurisdiction conferred on courts of the United States or any State." Id.
The savings clause was added because the exclusive jurisdiction provision raised
concern that the jurisdiction of state and federal courts might be eclipsed. See Curran,
456 U.S. at 386. Chairman Rodino of the House Committee on the Judiciary suggested
an amendment because he was worried that the provision, by itself, might be read
to pre-empt state courts from enforcing futures contracts under general commercial
law, or oust federal courts of their jurisdiction. Leist, 638 F.2d at 314. Citing antitrust
jurisdiction of the commodity futures industry as an example, he asserted that it
should be clarified that federal courts retained the ability to try federal claims. See
id. Senator Clark observed that under the exclusive jurisdiction provision, the treble-
damages provisions of bills he and Senator McGovern had introduced (which were
never acted upon, id. at 318) might be prohibited along with all federal court actions.
Id. at 315. To allay such fears, Congress added the savings clause and clarified in
the record that "nothing in the Act would supersede or limit the jurisdiction presently
conferred on courts of the United States or any state." 120 CONG. Rnc. 34,997 (1974)
(statement of Sen. Talmadge) (emphasis added). RICO jurisdiction, of course, had
been conferred on the courts of the United States four years earlier. See supra note
4 and accompanying text.
Congress' failure to enact a treble damages remedy in the CFTC Act of 1974
bespeaks nothing of Congress' intent to allow RICO claims for conduct violative of
the CEA. See, e.g., Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 28 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Simplot v. Strobl, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985) ("The fact that Congress
considered and rejected a treble damage remedy for [Commodity Exchange] Act
violations says nothing about its view with respect to antitrust violations"). Congress
might have decided that treble damages under the antitrust laws (and under RICO)
were sufficient so that no such remedy was required under the CEA. See id. "The
most that can safely be implied from the rejection of [treble damages] is that it was
19881
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Further changes in the CEA enacted later that year 10 continued
this trend. The addition of section 22, for example, expressly pro-
vided what the Supreme Court had implied-a private right of
action under the CEA."' Congress determined that "the right of
an aggrieved person to sue a violator of the Act is critical to
protecting the public and fundamental to maintaining the credibility
of the futures market[s]." '" 2 Indeed, Congress perceived the avail-
ability of all the remedies under the CEA-arbitration," 3 repara-
tions,"14 and the private right of action-as supplementing the
regulatory and enforcement programs of the CFTC." 5
Notwithstanding that the above remedies were characterized as
"exclusive remedies" for violations of the CEA," 6 Congress broad-
ened the role of the states as well as the applicability of federal
not Congress's purpose either to expand or contract treble damage remedies." Id.;
see also Aiken v. Lerner, 485 F. Supp. 871, 877 (D.N.J. 1980) (failure of Congress
to enact treble damages merely evidences reluctance to expand private recovery under
existing private right).
110. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294.
111. See CEA § 22, 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1982). Section 22- of the CEA provides in
pertinent part:
(1) Any person ... who violates this chapter [the Commodity Exchange
Act] or who willfully aids, abets, counsels, induces, or procures the com-
mission of a violation of this chapter shall be liable for actual damages
resulting from one or more of the transactions referred to in clauses (A)
through (D) of this paragraph and caused by such violation to any other
person-
(A) who received trading advice from such person for a fee;
(B) who made through such person any contract of sale of any commodity
for future delivery ... or who deposited with or paid to such person
money, securities, or property (or incurred debt in lieu thereof) in
connection with any order to make such contract; ...
(D) who purchased or sold a contract referred to in clause (B)
hereof if the violation constitutes a manipulation of the price of any
such contract or the price of the commodity underlying such contract.
(2) ... the rights of action authorized by this subsection and by sections
7a(ll), 18, and 21(b)(10) of this title shall be the exclusive remedies under
this chapter available to any person who sustains loss as a result of any
alleged violation of this chapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
112. H.R. REP. No. 565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 56-57 [hereinafter H.R.
REP. No. 565], reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmu. NEWs 3871, 3905-06
(emphasis added).
113. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; infra note 316 and accompanying
text for a brief discussion of this term.
114. See supra note 99 and accompanying text; infra note 317 and accompanying
text for a brief discussion of this term.
115. H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 112, at 57, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMNm. NEWS 3871, 3906.
116. See CEA § 22(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(2) (1982).
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and state law "to foster a coordinated and effective program to
detect and prosecute those who engage in unlawful conduct.""17
Moreover, Congress added a "controlling person" provision for
actions brought by the Commission"' and expanded aiding and
abetting liability" 9 by applying such liability to all legal proceedings
arising under the CEA.' 20
In sum, the progressive legislative history of the Commodity
Exchange Act demonstrates Congress' intent to protect futures cus-
tomers from market manipulation and other fraudulent conduct. 2'
Underlying this intent is the realization that a sound futures industry
benefits the entire economy.122 The immediate beneficiaries of healthy
futures markets are the producers and processors (hedgers) 23 of
commodities who minimize the risk of loss in the cash markets by
trading in the futures markets. 24 The entire nation, however, benefits
indirectly from the consequent lower retail prices of those com-
modities.'25
III. Respondeat Superior
Under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior, a master
or principal is liable in certain instances for the wrongful acts of
117. H.R. REp. No. 565, supra note 112, at 104, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AmDN. NEws 3871, 3953. Section 6d of the CEA was amended to permit
any authorized state official to proceed in a state court against any registered person
(except a floor broker or futures association) for violations of the anti-fraud provisions
of the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 13a;2(8) (1982). Section 12(e) was also added to ensure that
nothing in the CEA superseded or pre-empted criminal prosecution under any federal
criminal statute, or the application of any federal or state. statute to any futures
transaction not conducted on a contract market or committed by any person not
registered pursuant to the Act. CEA § 12(e), 7 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982).
118. See CEA § 13(b), 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b) (1982). Such provision holds any person
who directly or indirectly controls a violator of the CEA liable to the same extent
as the violator. See id.
119. See H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 112, at 104, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmN. NEws 3871, 3953. Such provision holds a person who assists or
causes another to violate the CEA equally responsible with the violator. See CEA.
§ 13(a), 7 U.S.C. § 13c(a) (1982).
120. See CEA § 13(a), 7 U.S.C. § 13c(a) (1982). Prior to 1982, aiding and abetting
liability applied only to administrative disciplinary proceedings. See supra note 89 and
accompanying text.
121. Curran, 456 U.S. at 390; see supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. See
supra note 8 for a description of fraudulent conduct related to commodity futures
transactions.
122. Curran, 456 U.S. at 390.
123. See supra note 5 and accompanying text for a discussion of the roles of
hedgers and speculators in futures markets.
124. Curran, 456 U.S. at 390.
125. Id.
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his servant or agent.' 26 Based on traditional agency principles,' 27
this doctrine makes an employer liable for his employee's misconduct
if that conduct falls within the employee's scope of employment;' 28
his apparent authority; 29 or when the conduct is attributable to
reckless or negligent supervision by the employer. 130
The doctrine of respondeat superior is premised upon fundamental
notions of justice and public policy. 3' The paramount consideration
has been articulated as follows: "[Hie who expects to derive [some]
advantage from an act which is done by another for him, must
answer for any injury which a third person may sustain from it.9132
A principal is liable, therefore, for the wrongful acts of his agent
committed in the business the agent was designated to perform even
if the principal is unaware of those wrongful actions. 33 Moreover,
if the agent acts under apparent authority,'3 4 the principal remains
126. Section 219 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency delineates when a master
is liable for the wrongful actions of his servant:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed
while acting in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting
outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal
and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), supra note 31, § 219.
127. Markham & Meltzer, supra note 89, at 1118-19.
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 31, § 228; PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 41, § 70, at 502.
129. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 31, §§ 8, 140, 219(2)(d), 249, 261-
262; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 41, § 70, at 508.
130. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 31, § 213.
131. Markham & Meltzer, supra note 89, at 1119.
.132. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 204 (1917) (quoting Hall v.
Smith, 2 Bing. Rep. 156, 160 (1824)); accord Guy v. Donald, 203 U.S. 399, 406
(1906) ("[wjhen a man is carrying on business in his private interest and entrusts a
part of the work to another, the world has agreed to make him answer for that
other as if he had done the work himself") (Holmes, J.).
133. CFTC v. Premex, Inc., 655 F.2d 779, 784 n.10 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing Fey v.
Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1052 n.19 (7th Cir. 1974)); see Paul F. Newton &
Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1980).
134. "Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations of another person
by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from
and in accordance with the other's manifestations to such third persons." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 31, § 8. Such authority, which includes the authority to perform
a variety of acts related to the agent's position, REuscI-.EIN & GREGORY, supra note
31, § 23; at 61, usually arises when the principal's behavior allows a third party to
mistakenly believe that the agent is acting within his actual authority. See id. § 23,
at 57-58.
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answerable for the agent's fraud although the agent acted solely
for his own benefit.' Similarly, the principal is responsible when
an agent's misrepresentations cause pecuniary loss to a third party, 3 6
or when an agent tortiously injures another party's business relations.'37
A principal's liability under the apparent authority theory, which
has "long been the settled rule in the federal [court] system,"' 38 is
predicated upon the fact that the agent's position enables him to
perpetrate a fraud upon another because, in the eyes of that third
person, the agent still appears to be acting in the ordinary course
of the duties entrusted to him.' Thus, "the employer may be
entirely blameless" and "may have exercised the utmost human
foresight,"'140 but if an employee, while acting within the scope of
his duties, injures another person-even in disobedience "of the
employer's positive and specific command-the employer is an-
swerable for the consequences."141
Corporations are generally held accountable as principals under
the same theories.' 42 Because a corporation acts only through its
agents' 43 it can be held responsible to third parties for damages
caused by its agents' conduct,'" even if unlawful activities are
perpetrated by "minor" employees without the knowledge of senior
corporate officers.' 45 The general rule that a principal is answerable
135. American Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
566 (1982). "If a particular act is authorized, or sufficiently similar to an authorized
act, finding that act to be within the [employee's apparent authority] does not require
that the act have conferred any particular benefit, financial or otherwise, on the
employer." Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 624 (5th Cir. 1973).
136. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 566.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 567. The Supreme Court cited several federal cases to support this
conclusion. See id. at 567-68.
139. Id. at 566.
140. White, 243 U.S. at 198.
141. Id.; see United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
142. Blakey, supra note 51, at 292 n.151.
143. Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1306 (7th Cir. 1987); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 411 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
618 (1941); see Minnesota Odd Fellows Home Found. v. Engler & Budd Co., 630
F. Supp. 797, 800 (D. Minn. 1986); see also New York Cent. R.R. v. United States,
212 U.S. 481, 492-95 (1909) (discussing criminal liability of corporation for acts of
its agents).
144. New York Cent. R.R., 212 U.S. at 493; see Note, Judicial Efforts to Redirect
an Errant Statute: Civil RICO and the Misapplication of Vicarious Corporate Liability,65 B.U.L. REv. 561, 600 (1985) [hereinafter Misapplication].
145. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d at 572. In this per curiam opinion affirming the
criminal liability of a corporation for antitrust violations committed by its employees,
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for the fraud or misrepresentations of its agent occurring within
the scope of the agent's authority or employment, therefore, applies
unequivocally to corporations. 46 Thus, a company can incur liability
even though it did not authorize the fraud or know of its employees'
conduct. 14
7
In New York Cent. R.R. v. United States, 48 for example, the
Supreme Court upheld the criminal convictions of a railroad com-
pany and its employee. 49 The Court acknowledged that there are
some crimes which, by their very nature, cannot be committed by
corporate entities. 50 It recognized, however, that "there is a large
class of offenses" where the nature of the crime "consists in
purposely doing the things prohibited by statute."'' In such cases,
there is "no good reason why corporations may not be held re-
sponsible for and charged with the knowledge and purposes of their
agents [who are] acting within the authority conferred upon them." 5 2
While the company in New York Cent. R.R. apparently benefited
from its employee's unlawful activities,' companies have incurred
the Fourth Circuit upheld the following jury instructions regarding corporate liability:
When the act of an agent is within the scope of his employment or within
the scope of his apparent authority, the corporation is held legally responsible
for it. This is true even though the agent's acts may be unlawful, and
contrary to the corporation[']s actual instructions....
Id. Such jury instructions, as the court of appeals noted, are amply supported by
federal case law. Id. at 573. Indeed, a "corporation which employs an agent in a
responsible position cannot say that the man was only 'authorized' to act legally and
the corporation will not answer for his violations of law which inure to the corporation's
benefit." Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 150 (6th Cir. 1960);
see supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. FCMs likewise benefit when their
agents or employees perpetrate frauds upon customers. See supra note 8.
146. Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740-41 (10th Cir. 1974); see
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CoRPoRATIoNs AND OTHER BusINESS ENTERPRISES
§ 184, at 479 (3d ed. 1983).
147. Kerbs, 502 F.2d at 740-41; see supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text; cf.
Rosenthal & Co. v. CFTC, 802 F.2d 963, 967 (7th Cir. 1986) (FCM's ignorance of
its agent's fraud irrelevant).
148. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
149. Id. at 489, 499. The Supreme Court stated that it is "well established that in
actions for tort the corporation may be held responsible for damages for the dcts of
its agent within the scope of his employment," even when the agent acts "wantonly
or recklessly or against the express orders of the principal." Id. at 493 (citing Lake
Shore & Michigan S. R.R. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 109, 111 (1893)). Carrying this
principle to criminal law, the Court held that an agent's acts may be controlled, in
the public interest, by imputing them to the corporation and thereupon imposing
criminal penalties. New York Cent. R.R., 212 U.S. at 494.
150. New York Cent. R.R., 212 U.S. at 494.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 494-95 (citations omitted).
153. Id. at 493, 495.
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liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior for their em-
ployees' unlawful acts without deriving any benefit whatsoever. 5 4
Finally, the common law rule of respondeat superior which precludes
punitive damages does not apply to special statutes providing treble
damages.155 The common law doctrine may, therefore, be specifically
altered by statute.156
A. Respondeat Superior Under the CEA
On its face, section 2(a)(1)(A) of the CEA imposes strict liability
upon a principal for the misconduct of its agents occurring within
the scope of their agency. 57 Because the section incorporates certain
154. See, e.g., Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976) (securities
brokerage firm); American Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556
(nonprofit corporation). In Holloway, for example, a brokerage firm was held re-
sponsible for the fraud of its employee despite neither knowing of his transgressions
nor receiving commissions from those activities. Holloway, 536 F.2d at 695.
In Hydrolevel, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision that a
nonprofit membership corporation (ASME) was liable for violations of federal antitrust
laws perpetrated by its agents acting within the scope of their apparent authority.
Hydolevel, 456 U.S. at 565, 578. ASME objected to the imposition of treble damages
against it, arguing that such damages were punitive. Id. at 574. The courts, ASME
asserted, traditionally refrained from imposing punitive damages upon principals for
their agents' conduct under the apparent authority rule. Id. at 574-75.
The Supreme Court rejected ASME's arguments. Because treble damages both deter
violations and compensate victims, the Court held the corporation fully accountable
for the actions of its agents committed under their apparent authority to comport
with the purposes of the antitrust laws and principles of agency law. Id. at 575-76.
The Court found the apparent authority corollary of respondeat superior consistent
with Congress' intention that the antitrust laws "sweep broadly," whether or not the
agent intends to benefit the principal. Id. at 573-74 & n. 11. The Supreme Court also
noted that Congress intended antitrust liability to apply to "[e]very person" which,
under the antitrust laws, includes corporations and associations. Id. at 573 n. 11.
Similarly, RICO's breadth reaches "any person." See RICO § 1962, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962 (1982); supra note 55 and accompanying text. "Person" is defined to include
"any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."
RICO § 1961(3), 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982); see supra notes 15-18, 28-29 and
accompanying text; infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
155. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 576 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), supra note 31,
§ 217 C comment c). RICO is another special statute providing treble damages for
injured plaintiffs. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
156. Markham & Meltzer, supra note 89, at 1120.
157. Rosenthal, 802 F.2d at 966; In re Big Red Commodity Corp., [1984-1986
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,623, at 30,667 (CFTC June 7,
1985). Section 2(a)(1)(A) of the Commodity Exchange Act provides the following:
The act, omission, or failure of any official, agent or any other person
acting for any individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust
within the scope of his employment or office shall be deemed the act,
omission, or failure of such individual, association, partnership, corporation,
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common law rules of respondeat superior,'58 there is no "good
faith" shield to protect the FCM from liability for its agents' or
employees"5 9 misdeeds.' 60 Section 2(a)(1)(A) expressly imputes an
agent's wrongful conduct to the principal under the CEA, even in
the context of criminal sanctions.16 1
Under the CEA, the liability of an FCM for the acts of its agents
or employees is sustained almost as a matter of course. 62 In fact,
the CFTC has determined that FCMs are responsible for their
employees' compliance with applicable Commission and exchange
or trust, as well as of such official, agent, or other person.
7 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). The CFTC has determined that this provision encompasses "all
principal-agent relationships." Bogard v. Abraham-Rietz & Co., [1984-1986 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,273, at 29,393 n.13 (CFTC July 5, 1984).
158. Rosenthal, 802 F.2d at 966; see Gravois v. Fairchild, [1977-1980 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,706, at 22,878 n.34 (E.D. La. 1978)
(WESTLAW, DCT database); Sackheim, Administrative Enforcement of the Federal
Commodities Laws by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 12 SETON HALL
L. REV. 445, 463 (1982) [hereinafter Sackheim].
159. See supra note 31 for a discussion of who may be considered an agent or
employee of an FCM.
160. See Rosenthal, 802 F.2d at 966; CFTC v. Premex, Inc., 655 F.2d 779, 784
n.10 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Buckwalter, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 22,782, at 31,269 (CFTC Sept. 27, 1985), appeal dismissed, [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,375, at 33,033 (CFTC Dec. 2,
1986); Sackheim, supra note 158, at 465.
161. See Rosenthal, 802 F.2d at 966; see also In re Siegel Trading Co., [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,905, at 31,360 (CFTC Nov. 21,
1984) (no knowledge or participation by FCM needed as CEA specifically imputes
liability for violations by those acting for it) (citing Irving Weis & Co. v. Brannan,
171 F.2d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 1948)).
162. See Rosenthal, 802 F.2d at 966; Clayton Brokerage Co. v. CFTC, 794 F.2d
573, 581-83 (11th Cir. 1986); Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co. Commodities, 688
F.2d 1193, 1198 n.5 (8th Cir. 1982); CFTC v. Commodity Fluctuations Sys., Inc.,
583 F. Supp. 1382, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd without opinion, 788 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.
1986); Valek v. Murlas Commodities, Inc., 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,908,
at 34,216 (CFTC Sept. 9, 1987); Seligman v. First Commodity Corp., [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,790, at 34,085 (CFTC Aug. 13,
1987); Shutvet v. Breinling, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
23,520, at 33,404 (CFTC Mar. 11, 1987); Hall v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis,
Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,665, at 30,829-
30 (CFTC July 16, 1985), modified and aff'd, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,317, at 32,891 (CFTC Oct. 8, 1986); Big Red, 22,623,
at 30,666; Siegel, 22,905, at 31,630-31; In re Kansas City Board of Trade, [1984-
1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,809, at 31,383 n.2 (CFTC
Nov. 14, 1985); Buckwalter, 22,782, at 31,269.
Interestingly, the constitutionality of a substantially similar section in another statute
was upheld by the Supreme Court more than a decade before federal regulation of
the commodity futures industry. See New York Cent. R.R., 212 U.S. at 496-97. See
supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text for the history of federal regulation of the
futures industry.
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regulations including the provisions of the CEA. 163 The more recent
amendments to the CEA,' 64 moreover, supplement rather than dis-
place the respondeat superior framework of section 2(a)(1)(A). 165
B. Potential Application of Respondeat Superior Under RICO
Courts are divided on the question of whether the doctrine of
respondeat superior can be applied under civil RICO.166 This division
stems in part from an underlying conflict concerning the sections
of the Act under which the doctrine should be utilized. RICO
defines the terms "person" and "enterprise" very broadly.,67 "Per-
son" encompasses "any individual or entity capable of holding a
legal or beneficial interest in property,' '1 68 while "enterprise" in-
cludes "any individual, partnership, corporation, association or other
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity.' '169 The underlying conflict involves
the application of these terms in sections 1962(a) and 1962(c) of
the Act; that is, whether the terms can be applied simultaneously
to a single organization or corporation.
Section 1962(c) prohibits any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise that affects interstate commerce from directly,
163. See Kansas City Board of Trade, 22,809, at 31,384. The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission has even restated § 2(a)(1)(A) of the CEA in one of the
Commission's regulations. See CFTC Reg. § 1.2, 17 C.F.R. § 1.2 (1987).
164. See supra notes 92-120 for a discussion of the more recent amendments to
the CEA.
165. Rosenthal, 802 F.2d at 966-67; see Big Red, 22,623, at 30,668-69. Originally
§ 2(a) of the Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 998 (1922), the section
was changed to § 2(a)(1) in the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974. See CFTC Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 101(a)(l), 88 Stat. 1389. The
section was then amended to its present form in 1982. See Futures Trading Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 101(a)(l), 96 Stat. 2294, 2297 (codified at 7 U.S.C.
§ 4 (1982)).
The section's survival in light of comprehensive re-examinations and significant
amendments to the CEA evinces Congress' belief that the provision is a necessary
component of the Act. See Curran, 456 U.S. at 381-82. As Congress stated, "This
section had been included in the [Commodity Exchange] Act many years ago and in
essence provides respondeat superior and general principal-agent standards for imposing
liability on employers and principals for the acts of their employees or agents." H.R.
REP. No. 565, supra note 112, at 105, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN.
NEws 3871, 3954.
166. See infra notes 167-220 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dissonance
within the federal judiciary on the use of respondeat superior in civil RICO cases.
167. Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir.
1984), aff'd per curiam, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); see supra notes 15, 17 and accompanying
text.
168. RICO § 1961(3), 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982).
169. Id. § 1961(4), 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
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or indirectly, conducting or participating in such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity.i7 0 Virtually all courts
which have considered whether the "enterprise" and the "person"
in section 1962(c) may be the same entity have determined that the
"enterprise" and the "person" must be distinct.17' The Eleventh
Circuit's ruling in United States v. Hartley 72 is the only major
decision to the contrary, 73 notwithstanding the fact that a corpo-
ration, which is expressly included in the definition of "enter-
prise,' 74 "obviously qualifies as a 'person' under RICO and may
be subject to RICO liability."' 75 Although the overwhelming majority
of courts refuse to follow Hartley,7 6 some courts have recognized
that had the Eleventh Circuit held otherwise, it would have allowed
a corrupt organization to escape liability. 7 7 A few decisions, in-
cluding Hartley, have even suggested that redrafting the complaint
170. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). See supra note 28 for the full text of this provision.
171. See Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1306 (7th Cir. 1987); Garbade
v. Great Divide Mining & Milling Corp., 831 F.2d 212, 213-14 (10th Cir. 1987);
Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1359 (3d Cir. 1987)
(citing B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Ref. Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1984)); Luthi
v. Tonka Corp., 815 F.2d 1229, 1230 (8th Cir. 1987); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc.,
814 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1987); Bishop v. Corbitt Marine Ways, Inc., 802 F.2d 122,
123 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); United States v. Benny, 786 F.2d 1410, 1415-16
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 668 (1986); Bennett v. United States Trust Co.,
770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); United States
v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1105 (1983).
172. 678 F.2d 961 (l1th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
173. See id. at 988. In Hartley, a corporation perpetrated various frauds against
the federal government through agents which included a vice president, a plant manager,
and low level employees. See id. at 965-67. Despite the defendants' complaints of an
"emasculation" of § 1962(c), id. at 988 n.43, the court held that a corporation may
simultaneously fulfill the roles of the defendant ("person") and the enterprise under
that section. Id. at 988-90. The court of appeals, recognizing that under ordinary
principles of corporate liability (respondeat superior) a company is liable for the acts
of its agents and employees, id. at 988 n.43, was incredulous that the individuals
associated with a corporation could be prosecuted under RICO, but that the corporation
or enterprise could not. See id. at 989.
174. See supra notes 17, 169 and accompanying text for the definition of "en-
terprise."
175. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401; see Rogers, 834 F.2d at 1306; see also RICO
§ 1961(3), 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982) ("person" is individual or entity capable of
holding an interest in property). See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 122(2),
122(4) (1983) (former section granting corporation power to sue and be sued in all
courts, and latter enabling a corporation to own, use or otherwise deal in or with
real or personal property, or any interest therein, wherever situated); N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
LAW §§ 202(2), 202(4) (McKinney 1986) (same).
176. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
177. See Enright Ref. Co., 751 F.2d at 633; see also Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401.
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against the company' or charging the company under section
1962(a) 7 9 would have harmonized the result in that case with the
majority view.8 0
The latter suggestion that a corporation may be properly charged
as both the "person" and the "enterprise" under section 1962(a)
has been adopted in five circuits' 8 ' and rejected in one.8 2 Courts
outside those circuits have likewise split on the issue.8 3 Section
1962(a) makes it unlawful for any person who directly or indirectly
received any income from a pattern of racketeering activity to
directly, or indirectly, use or invest any part of that income to
acquire any interest in, establish, or operate any enterprise affecting
interstate commerce.8 4 The courts which permit the culpable person
and enterprise to be the same entity under section 1962(a) do so
in order to hold the corporation liable when it is the "perpetrator"
of the illegal activity;8 5 that is, when "corporate agents engage in
a pattern of racketeering activity8 6 redounding to the benefit of
the corporation."'1 7
178. See Hartley, 678 F.2d at 989.
179. See Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401 n.18.
180. See Enright Ref. Co., 751 F.2d at 633.
181. See Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1307 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing
Masi v. Ford City Bank & Trust Co., 779 F.2d 397, 401-02 (7th Cir. 1985)); Garbade
v. Great Divide Mining & Milling Corp., 831 F.2d 212, 213-14 (10th Cir. 1987);
Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1360-61 (3d Cir. 1987);
Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 529 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Schreiber
Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986)); Schofield
v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1986).
182. See United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983).
183. Some district courts have not required the "person" to be distinct from the
"enterprise" under § 1962(a) of RICO. See King v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [19871 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,176, at 95,793 (D.D.C. 1987) (WESTLAW, DCT database);
Welek III v. Solomon, 650 F. Supp. 972, 974 (E.D. Mo. 1987); DeMuro v. E.F.
Hutton, 643 F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781, 806 (E.D. La. 1986); Conan Properties,
Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1167, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Other courts have required the "person' to be distinct from the "enterprise" under
§ 1962(a). See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 653 F. Supp. 908, 916 (D.
Minn. 1987); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 581 F. Supp. 350, 357-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Bays
v. Hunter Sav. Ass'n, 539 F. Supp. 1020, 1024-25 n.l (S.D. Ohio 1982).
184. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982). See supra note 28 for the pertinent text of this
provision.
185. See Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1361; Serv-Well, 806 F.2d at 1398; Haroco, 747
F.2d at 401-02.
186. See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text for the content of this element
of RICO.
187. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401.
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Courts which require the person and the enterprise to be distinct
from one another refuse to impose treble damage liability upon a
corporation for the misdeeds of its lower level employees, especially
when it is merely the "instrument" or "victim" of the wrongful
activity.' In such instances, "no salutary remedial purpose would
be served by attributing the conduct of an individual involved in
the pattern of racketeering activity to the individual or entity playing
the role of the enterprise." '18 9
These competing interests were neatly balanced in the leading
Seventh Circuit opinion in Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. :190
The use of the terms "employed by" and "associated with" [in
section 1962(c)] appears to contemplate a person distinct from
the enterprise....
... As we read subsection (c), the "enterprise" and the "per-
son" must be distinct. However, a corporation-enterprise may
be held liable under subsection (a) when the corporation is also
a perpetrator. As we parse subsection (a), a "person" (such as
a corporation-enterprise) acts unlawfully if it receives income
derived directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity
.. if the person uses the income in the establishment or operation
of an enterprise affecting commerce. Subsection (a) does not
contain any of the language in subsection (c) which suggests that
the liable person and the enterprise must be separate. Under
subsection (a), therefore, the liable person may be a corporation
using the proceeds of a pattern of racketeering activity in its
operations. This approach to subsection (a) thus makes the cor-
poration-enterprise liable under RICO when the corporation is
actually the direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of rack-
eteering activity, but not when it is merely the victim, prize, or
passive instrument of racketeering. This result is in accord with
the primary purpose of RICO, which, after all, is to reach those
who ultimately profit from racketeering, not those who are vic-
timized by it.191
In short, the language of section 1962(a) permits corporations to
serve as both the RICO person and the RICO enterprise. 92 Although
a literal reading of RICO tracks the Supreme Court's scrutiny of
188. Id.; see infra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
189. Blakey, supra note 51, at 323.
190. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd per curiam, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
191. Id. at 400-02 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added and in original); see also
Schofield, 793 F.2d at 31 ("[t]he language in section 1962(a) does not require a
relationship between the person and the enterprise as does section 1962(c), and so it
does not require the involvement of two separate entities").
192. Schofield, 793 F.2d at 32; see supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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the Act, 93 other courts equate the two subsections rather than
contrast them. 194 These tribunals have found, "in light of the iden-
tical terminology"' 95 used in each subsection, "if it is inappropriate
to plead [the same] identity in [section] 1962(c), it is then inap-
propriate to plead it under section 1962(a).' ' 96
Courts are likewise at odds over the applicability of the respondeat
superior doctrine under sections 1962(a) and 1962(c). 97 Two basic
arguments have been posited against using the doctrine to impose
RICO liability under section 1962(c). The first argument emanates
from a plain reading of the section-the application of respondeat
superior renders section 1962(c) moot because such application con-
troverts the section's language. 98 In other words, the doctrine should
not be used "to accomplish an end-run around [the] required dis-
tinction between [the] person and [the] enterprise under section
1962[(c)]."' 99 Thus an attempt to hold the corporation-enterprise
193. Masi, 779 F.2d at 402; see supra notes 44-45, 50 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Computer Sciences, 689 F.2d at 1190 ("[wje conclude that 'enterprise'
was meant to refer to a being different from, not the same as or part of, the person
whose behavior the act was designed to prohibit"). As another court stated:
One can interpret the lack of a required nexus between person and enterprise
in section 1962(a) to indicate the need for a more distinct pleading of
enterprise and statute violator because the statute contemplates an enterprise
which can be entirely unrelated to the predicate acts.... [A] section 1962(a)
"enterprise" can be the bounty purchased with the racketeering profits, the
entity used to "launder" the ill-gotten gains.
Rush, 628 F. Supp. at 1197.
195. Schofield, 793 F.2d at 31.
196. Rush, 628 F. Supp. at 1197.
197. See infra notes 198-220 and accompanying text. In the following cases, the
courts refused to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior against corporations or
other principals under § 1962(c) of RICO: Rogers, 834 F.2d at 1306-07; Petro-Tech,
824 F.2d at 1351; Tonka Corp., 815 F.2d at 1230; Schofield, 793 F.2d at 32; American
Bonded Warehouse Corp., v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 653 F. Supp. 861,
867 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 647 F. Supp.
1026, 1032 (N.D. Il. 1986); Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 107,
109 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Rush, 628 F. Supp. at 1194; Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp.
757, 760 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20,
24 n.9 (N.D. I11. 1982). See generally Misapplication, supra note 144, at 590-91 (arguing
against use of respondeat superior under RICO).
In the following cases, the courts applied the respondeat superior doctrine under
§ 1962(c) of RICO: Hartley, 678 F.2d at 988-89 n.43; Connors v. Lexington Ins.
Co., 666 F. Supp. 434, 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. (FSLIC)
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 1331, 1342 (D.P.R. 1987); Tryco
Trucking Co. v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1327, 1334 (W.D.N.C. 1986);
Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 811 (D. Md. 1985). See infra notes 216-20 and
accompanying text for § 1962(a) cases.
198. See Schofield, 793 F.2d at 32; see also Rogers, 834 F.2d at 1306-07.
199. Rush, 628 F. Supp. at 1194; see Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401 n.18. See supra
notes 167-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the person/enterprise dichotomy.
1988]
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
liable under section 1962(c) by applying the doctrine of respondeat
superior would circumvent the section,2 00° accomplishing indirectly
what it denies directly. 20 1
The second argument, based on policy considerations, reflects a
reluctance to allow lower corporate employees to thrust treble dam-
age liability on a "wholly unwitting" corporation.20 2 To impose
,such liability on a company for the alleged misconduct of its lower
level employees when the company is an "instrument" or "victim ' 20 3
of their racketeering activity, it is argued, would be an obvious
distortion of the Act.204 Because the "person" who is answerable
under RICO must have been actively engaged in the pattern of
racketeering activity, an anomalous result of RICO liability would
be inflicted upon corporations which serve merely as "conduits"
of that activity.205 Moreover, even if companies willfully failed to
supervise their employees, such inaction would not amount to a
knowing or intentional participation by the corporations in their
employees' racketeering activities. 206 In short, the civil liability of
corporations under RICO should be based on their knowing or
intentional participation in the illicit acts, not mere negligence or
recklessness.20 7
In Hartley,20 however, the Eleventh Circuit stated:
Since a corporation is liable for the acts of its agents and
employees, it permits an employee's activities to serve as proof
of the two predicate acts209 required by section 1962(c). This is
simply a reality to be faced by corporate entities. With the
advantages of incorporation, must come the [attendant] respon-
sibilities. 210
Other courts, following the lead of the Supreme Court in American
Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp. ,211 have stated
200. American Nat'l Bank, 647 F. Supp. at 1032.
201. Schofield, 793 F.2d at 33.
202. Parnes, 548 F. Supp. at 24 n.9.
203. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
204. Rush, 628 F. Supp. at 1195; see Rogers, 834 F.2d at 1306; Banque Worms
v. Luis A. Duque Pena E Hijos, LTDA., 652 F. Supp. 770, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
205. Dakis, 574 F. Supp. at 760.
206. O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 91,509, at 98,562 (D. Ariz. 1984) (WESTLAW, DCT database).
207. Id.
208. 678 F.2d 961 (lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983). See supra
note 173 for a discussion of the Hartley decision.
209. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of predicate
acts under RICO usually committed in the course of commodities fraud.
210. Hartley, 678 F.2d at 988 n.43.
211. 456 U.S. 556 (1982). See supra note 154 for a discussion of this case.
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that.when a federal statute, such as RICO, imposes civil liability
upon those persons who violate its provisions, normal rules of
agency law apply absent evidence of contrary congressional intent. 21 2
Thus some courts have found the twin doctrines of apparent au-
thority and respondeat superior wholly applicable against corpo-
rations under section 1962(c). 2 3 Again, the use of respondeat superior
principles under section 1962(c) has been criticized as ostensibly
obliterating the person/enterprise distinction required under the sec-
tion. 21 4 This criticism is based on the belief that, because the culpable
"person" and the "enterprise" must be separate entities under
section 1962(c), applying the doctrine to hold the corporation-en-
terprise liable would circumvent both the language and design of
the section. 21
5
Courts have determined, however, that a corporation's liability
for the acts of its employees or agents is amply provided for in
section 1962(a), under which the person and the enterprise need
not be distinct. 216 Accordingly, such courts find that companies can
be susceptible to RICO damages if their actions or policies permit
the racketeering activity that RICO was designed to deter. 217 In
short, when the fruits of that activity accrue to a corporation-
enterprise, that enterprise may then be reached under section
1962(a) i.21 Moreover, while such company's use of the illicit proceeds
212. See Connors, 666 F. Supp. at 453; Tryco, 634 F. Supp. at 1334; see also
Morley, 610 F. Supp. at 811 (respondeat superior, normally applicable in criminal
realm, is equally applicable in either criminal or civil RICO cases).
213. See supra note 197.
214. See Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1359; American Nat'l Bank, 647 F. Supp. at
1032; Gaudette v. Panos, 644 F. Supp. 826, 841 (D. Mass. 1986), modified on rehear-
ing, 650 F. Supp. 912 (D. Mass. 1987); Misapplication, supra note 144, at 592. See
supra notes 167-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the person/enterprise
distinction under § 1962(c) of RICO.
215. American Nat'l Bank, 647 F. Supp. at 1032; see supra notes 198-201 and
accompanying text.
216. American Nat'l Bank, 647 F. Supp. at 1032; see Rogers, 834 F.2d at 1306-
07; Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1360; Serv-Well, 806 F.2d at 1398; Haroco, 747 F.2d
at 401 n.18. See supra notes 181-96 and accompanying tekt for a discussion of the
person/enterprise dichotomy under § 1962(a) of RICO.
217. The First Circuit agreed that corporations should not escape liability when
their actions or policies allow the type of racketeering activity outlawed by RICO,
although such companies could not be reached under § 1962(c). Schofield, 793 F.2d
at 33. The court relied on § 1962(a), however, to demonstrate that its restrictive
reading of § 1962(c) does not insulate corporations from all liability. Id. at 31 n.2.
218. See Rogers, 834 F.2d at 1306; Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1361; Serv-Well, 806
F.2d at 1398; American Nat'l Bank, 647 F. Supp. at 1033; B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v.
Enright Ref. Co., 617 F. Supp. 49, 52 (D.N.J. 1985). See supra note 50 for courts
which require plaintiffs to prove that they were injured by corporations' use or
investment of racketeering income.
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will rarely harm the plaintiff directly, the plaintiff's loss is necessarily
linked to the enterprise's gain.219 It is therefore argued that the
doctrine of respondeat superior can promote the legitimate reach
and express language of section 1962(a) when the doctrine is mustered
against corporations that profit from their agents' racketeering ac-
tivities .220
IV. Futures Commission Merchants Under Civil RICO
The commodity futures industry substantially affects the nation's
commerce. 22' The expanding federal regulation of the industry under
the CEA, which has progressively protected customers, demonstrates
the importance of futures markets to that commerce. 222 In regulating
the futures industry and its participants, the CEA regulates futures
commission merchants who typically maintain fiduciary relationships
with their customers. 223
Under the CEA, FCMs are held strictly liable for the acts or
omissions of their agents and employees. 224 The CEA expressly states,
however, that nothing contained in it shall supersede or limit the
jurisdiction of any federal or state court.225 Because corporations
can act only through their agents and employees, 2 6 corporations
are usually held responsible for the misconduct of their agents or
employees under federal and state law. 227 FCMs profit either directly
219. American Nat'l Bank, 647 F. Supp. at 1033.
220. See Rogers, 834 F.2d at 1306-07; Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1360-61; Serv-Well,
806 F.2d at 1398; Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401 n.18; American Nat'! Bank, 647 F. Supp.
at 1033; see also Abelson v. Strong, 644 F. Supp. 524, 534 (D. Mass. 1986) ("a
corporation's responsibility for the acts of its agents should be determined under
§ 1962(a)"); Ghouth v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1325, 1330 (N.D.
Ill. 1986) (although plaintiff was not necessarily relying on respondeat superior, even
if FCM's agent was the sole actor, FCM could be directly liable as it profited from
fraud); Dunham v. Independence Bank, 629 F. Supp. 983, 990 n.8, 991 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (activities of employee attributable to bank in straight respondeat superior terms;
bank could be held liable under § 1962(a) of RICO). But see Onesti v. Thomson
McKinnon Sec., Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] RICO Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH)
6,557, at 6,746 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (WESTLAW, DCT database) (respondeat superior
inapplicable in § 1962(a) cases). Indeed, "so long as the enterprise does in fact benefit
from the racketeering activity challenged, there is no reason why . .. an injured third
party may not recover from the enterprise." Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1361.
221. See supra notes 77-82, 121-25 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 83-120 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 142-56 and accompanying text.
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or indirectly from the usual misconduct (fraud) perpetrated by their
employees and agents against customers. 2 1 Such fraud inevitably
involves the use of the mails or wires,2 29 thereby giving rise to
RICO's jurisdiction. 230
As Congress has expressly directed that RICO be construed
broadly, 23  a fair reading of section 1962(a) allows a corporation,
even a "legitimate" one, 232 to assume the roles of both the culpable
"person" and the "enterprise. '233 Corporations, therefore, may
appropriately incur civil RICO liability for the racketeering activity
of their agents or employees in section 1962(a) cases.23 4 Thus, if
the requisites of the Act are met, 235 FCMs should be subject to
RICO liability and its attendant treble-damages provision. 23 6 Legally
and rationally, such a result appears to be sound.
As a practical matter, however, the result seems outrageous. For
example, courts have noted with disbelief that a plaintiff suing
under the securities laws may receive one-third the damages of a
plaintiff suing under RICO for essentially the same injury. 23 7 Un-
doubtedly, some courts are reluctant to allow a "racketeering"
statute to operate against respected or legitimate businesses; none-
theless, both the plain language and legislative history of RICO
clearly contemplate such a result.238 Two substantive arguments can
228. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 19-25, 59-66 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text; see also Moran, supra note 51,
at 732 n.6 (mentioning courts' aversion to the use of RICO against legitimate businesses).
233. See supra notes 181-92 and accompanying text. A constricted reading of
§ 1962(a) serves only to contort it. One district court respecting Fourth Circuit precedent,
for instance, declined to allow the culpable person and enterprise to be the same
entity. See Nunes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1055,
1064-65 (D. Md. 1985). The court nonetheless refused to dismiss the complaint against
the brokerage firm (the "person") because thefirm and its employees via an association
in fact constituted an appropriate "enterprise" under RICO. Id. at 1065. The court
(and the plaintiffs) could have expended less energy and imagination by simply including
the brokerage firm within the definitions of "enterprise" and "person" under
§ 1962(a). A narrow reading of § 1962(a), moreover, may literally insulate corporations
from the Act's reach. Schofield, 793 F.2d at 32; see supra note 50 and accompanying
text.
234. See supra notes 197-220 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 12-32 and accompanying text for the requisites of RICO in
commodity cases.
236. See supra note 14 for RICO's treble-damages provision.
237. Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 493 n.21 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
238. Moran, supra note 51, at 732-33 & n.6; see supra notes 43-76 and accompanying
text.
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be raised, however, against using section 1962(a) to reach futures
commission merchants. The first emanates from the face of section
1962(a) of RICO; the second from the language of section 22 of
the CEA.
A. The "Principal" Requirement in Section 1962(a)
Section 1962(a) makes it unlawful for any person to receive any
income directly or indirectly derived from a pattern of racketeering
activity "in which such person has participated as a principal within
the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, " to directly
or indirectly use or invest any part of such incQme, or the proceeds
thereof, in the establishment or operation of any enterprise affecting
interstate commerce. 2-" Cognizant that the RICO "person" includes
both individuals and entities, 24 0 section 2 of title 18 of the United
States Code provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its com-
mission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly
performed by him or another would be an offense against the
United States, is punishable as a principal3 4'
Thus, section 1962(a) seems to require some active participation by
the defendant in the racketeering activity, not just passive acceptance
of illicit income derived from that activity. 242
As originally proposed in Congress, section 1962(a) did not require
that the offender be considered a principal in the unlawful activity. 243
The section could, therefore, have been misused against innocent
recipients of illicit funds such as shareholders, operators and other
employees of a "legitimate" enterprise who received the income in
the form of dividends or salaries. 244 In response to a request by
the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures for
239. 18 U.S.C. § t962(a) (1982).
40. See supra notes 15, 167-68, 174-75 and accompanying text.
241. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
242. See Misapplication, supra note 144, at 596.
243. United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see Measures
Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623,
S. 1624, S. 1861, S. 2022, S. 2122, and S. 2292 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
66 (1969) [hereinafter Measures].
244. Loften, 518 F. Supp. at 851; Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291,
317 (1983) [hereinafter Tarlow].
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comments on the pending legislation, 245 the Justice Department opined
that section 1962(a) would suffer from vagueness problems. 246 The
department also feared that the section could be construed too
narrowly, paring its usefulness to the point of redundancy in light
of other federal statutes. 241 To prevent such misapplication of section
1962(a), the phrase requiring the defendant to participate as a
principal within the meaning of section 2 of title 18 of the United
States Code was added. 248
As one court has noted, the "principal" limitation was included
in section 1962(a) to clarify that its substantive offenses did not
pertain to legitimate businessmen. 249 The court did not, and indeed,
could not, state that the section did not apply to legitimate busi-
nesses-plaintiffs utilize RICO against all types of businesses. 250 In
fact, before the Supreme Court decided United States v. Turkette,251
a few courts had concluded that section 1962(a) applied only to
legitimate businesses. 2 2 Because a company or business acts solely
through its agents or employees, 253 liability under section 1962(a) is
predicated upon the racketeering acts of the corporation's employees
or agents in which the corporation, through such agents or em-
ployees, becomes a principal for purposes of the section. 254
Congress obviously envisioned this result. Two provisions from
an earlier bill were incorporated into the final RICO Act: the
"principal" requirement in section 1962(a) and the treble damage
civil remedy provided in section 1964(c). 255 Section 2(a) of the earlier
bill limited liability to a person who directly or indirectly received
income from any criminal activity "in which such person has par-
ticipated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18,
United States Code. ' ' 25 Section 2(b) of that same bill also provided:
245. See Measures, supra note 243, at 404.
246. See id. at 405-06.
247. See id. at 406.
248. See id. at 405-06.
249. See Loften, 518 F. Supp. at 851.
250. See supra notes 33-15 and accompanying text.
251. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
252. Tarlow, supra note 244, at 315-16.
253. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text; infra notes 255-70 and ac-
companying text.
255. Compare Measures, supra note 243, at 37, 39-41 (listing -in part provisions of
S. 1623) with id. at 61, 66-69 (listing in part provisions of S. 1861, which ultimately
became RICO). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. III 1986).-
256. Measures, supra note 243, at 39.
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(b) Whoever, being a director, officer, or agent of a corporation
who has authorized, ordered, or performed any act which con-
stitutes in whole or in part a violation of subsection (a) by such
corporation, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined
not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both.257
Notwithstanding the language addressing section 2 of title 18 of
the United States Code, Congress therefore, undoubtedly recognized
that the illegal actions of a company's agent could cause that
company to violate the strictures of RICO if the corporation received
the forbidden fruits of those actions. The final form of section
1962(a), moreover, deleted the word "knowingly" before the phrase
"received any income," thus impliedly nullifying scienter on the
part of the "person" in receipt of income derived from a pattern
of racketeering activity. 251
Whether cast as "apparent authority, '29 respondeat superior, 260
or ."direct liability, ' 261 the impact of section 1962(a) remains un-
changed: The corporation which directly or indirectly benefits from
a pattern of racketeering activity is subject to RICO's treble
damages. 262 Without a tangible monetary gain "redounding to the
benefit of the corporation, ' 263 a company could not be held an-
swerable under section 1962(a) because the section requires the
defendant-company to receive and use or invest the illicit income,
or the proceeds thereof, in that company's establishment or op-
eration .264
Since the defendant-corporation must accept such illicit income,
section 1962(a) also requires that the plaintiff demonstrate the nature,
source and disposition of those funds consumed by that enterprise. 265
This additional burden could easily be surmounted by a commodity
futures customer. Futures commission merchants, whether they want
257. Id. at 40.
258. Compare RICO § 1962(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982) ("knowingly" excluded)
with § 1962(a) of S. 1861, Measures, supra note 243, at 66 ("knowingly" included).
259. See supra notes 134-47 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 126-56 and accompanying text.
261. See Schofield, 793 F.2d at 32 & n.3; see also Ghouth, 642 F. Supp. at 1330-
31 (FCM allegedly directly involved in fraud).
262. See supra notes 185-91, 216-20 and accompanying text.
263. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401.
264. See RICO § 1962(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982); supra notes 15-18, 28, 218-
20 and accompanying text.
265. See Schofield, 793 F.2d at 31 n.2; Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Systems Corp., 576
F. Supp. 234, 242 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Moran, supra note 51, at 777-78 n.256; Tarlow,
supra note 244, at 321; Misapplication, supra note 144, at 596.
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to or not, consistently reap the "rewards" of their agents' or
employees' frauds in the forms of commissions or interest income.26
Perhaps this is one reason why Congress has held FCMs strictly
liable for their employees,' or agents,' violations of the CEA since
the inception of federal regulation of the commodity futures in-
dustry. 267 By acquiring illicit commissions or interest income based
on those commissions, an FCM may violate section 1962(a) because
it is directly or indirectly receiving income derived from a pattern
of racketeering activity perpetrated by its agents or employees and
using that income in its operation.2 68 A customer could easily trace
the ill-gotten gains of an FCM on the basis of the number of
transactions, the commission rates charged, and applicable interest
rates. Even outside the commodity futures industry, such tracing
has not generally encumbered the prosecution of a section 1962(a)
claim.2 69 Indeed, use by an enterprise of any amount of income
derived from RICO's unlawful activities, even "to purchase janitorial
supplies," may violate the section. 270
If the acts of the FCM's agents or employees are not, as they
should be, considered the acts of the FCM sufficient to make the
FCM a principal, a breach by the FCM of its fiduciary duty toward
its customers271 may be enough. 272 This fiduciary duty arises out of
the FCM-customer relationship. 273 Accordingly, the CFTC has prom-
ulgated numerous regulations to minimize the opportunity for an
266. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
268. See Roche v. E.F. Hutton, 658 F. Supp. 315, 321-22 (M.D. Pa. 1986); Ghouth,
642 F. Supp. at 1330; see also Commonwealth v. Derry Constr. Co., 617 F. Supp.
940, 943 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (logic dictates that corporation which receives income from
pattern of racketeering activity can invest that income in its operations); B.F. Hirsch,
Inc. v. Enright Ref. Co., 617 F. Supp. 49, 52 (D.N.J. 1985) (corporation "inevitably"
uses or invests income received from pattern of racketeering activity in operation of
its business). See supra note 8 which discusses FCMs' receipt of income from commodity
frauds.
269. See Tarlow, supra note 244, at 321; see also United States v. McNary, 620
F.2d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 1980) (allegation of indirect investment of proceeds of rack-
eteering activity into ertterprise is sufficient); see, e.g., Ford City Bank, 779 F.2d at
399 (bank withdrew $11,208.31 from depositor's account).
270. Tarlow, supra note 244, at 316.
271. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
272. See generally Ford City Bank, 779 F.2d at 401 (bank breached its fiduciary
duty to IRA depositor); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F.
Supp. 279, 332 (D.N.J. 1984) (union officials punishable as principals under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2 for failing to act despite affirmative duty to do so), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2247 (1986).
273. See supra note 31 for a thorough discussion of the FCM-customer relationship.
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FCM to breach that duty,274 including a regulation which requires
FCMs to diligently supervise the "activities of its partners, officers,
employees and agents." 2 75
Courts have recognized liability under section 2 of title 18 of the
United States Code where the "principal" has an affirmative duty
to act and fails to take such action.2 76 Under RICO, moreover, a
defendant's complicity in one type of unlawful activity regarding the
operations of the enterprise can make that defendant answerable for
other unlawful actions about which it has no knowledge or respon-
sibility.277 FCMs have a duty and a responsibility to protect their
customers from fraud perpetrated by their employees or agents.2 71
Thus, an FCM's acquiescence to a particular unlawful act or its failure
to protect its customers could render the company a principal for
purposes of section 1962(a) of RICO. 279
The primary shield raised by futures commission merchants and
other organizations is Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc. 280 In
Parnes, the court protected the defendant from RICO liability for
the fraud committed by two of its floor brokers acting under their
apparent authority. 21' The court observed that principles of respondeat
superior, "perhaps permissible to establish ordinary civil liability,
would be bizarre indeed as a means to warp the facts alleged in this
case into the RICO mold. '2 2 The court thus refused to allow "mal-
efactors at a low corporate level [to] thrust treble damage liability
on a wholly unwitting corporate management and shareholders.' '283
The court does not appear to have taken into consideration, however,
the special relationship between an FCM and its customers, 84 as well
as established jurisprudence concerning apparent authority. 2 5
274. See supra note 31 for pertinent CFTC regulations.
275. CFTC Reg. § 166.3, 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (1987).
276. See Local 560, 780 F.2d at 284.
277. See United States v. Melton, 689 F.2d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting United
States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978)).
278. See supra notes 8, 31, 157-65 and accompanying text.
279. Cf. Roche, 658 F. Supp. at 318 n.5 (FCM's employees committed fraud
through their association with FCM); Ghouth, 642 F. Supp. at 1330 (FCM may have
authorized employee's fraudulent actions from which it profited).
280. 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
281. See id.
282. Id. at 24 n.9.
283. Id.
284. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; infra notes 286-301 and accompanying
text.
285. See supra notes 134-47 and accompanying text; infra notes 302-12 and ac-
companying text.
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Both the courts and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
have recognized that a futures commission merchant, through its
employees and agents, "engages for pay in the solicitation and
acceptance of customers' orders, in the handling of customers' funds,
or in the furnishing of trading advice, and thereby is placed in a
position of trust and confidence vis-a-vis its customers. "286 Thus the
courts and the Commission have made clear that FCMs and their
agents stand in a fiduciary relationship to those customers on whose
behalf they act. 287 Accordingly, both the courts and the CFTC have
consistently held FCMs to a high standard of care and duty which
arises out of FCMs' fiduciary relationships with their customers. 28
The Commodity Exchange Act, moreover, makes FCMs wholly
responsible for both the acts and omissions of their employees and
agents. 2 9 This strict respondeat superior liability is regularly enforced
against futures commission merchants29° with good reason-individual
agents who deal with customers represent those customers' only
direct contact with FCMs in most instances. 29' The entire nature of
an FCM's business-the solicitation, acceptance, and handling of
customer. accounts for profit-is performed through its agents and
employees. 292 Even the court in Parnes recognized that the defendant
had over 100 branch offices in the United States through which its
employees or agents handled customer accounts .293 For "malefactors
286. Gordon v Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,976 n.16 (CFTC Apr. 10, 1980) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added), aff'd mem. sub nom. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc. v. CFTC, 673
F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1982). See supra note 31 for an in-depth look at the FCM-
customer relationship.
287. See supra note 286.
288. See supra notes 8 and 31 for a discussion of FCMs' duties relating to customers.
289. See CEA § 2(a)(l)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 4 (1982); supra notes 157-65 and accompanying
text.
290. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 31, 286 and accompanying text.
292. See id.
293. Parnes, 548 F. Supp. at 21 n.3. Interestingly, the defendant did not hesitate
to bring a RICO action against its own agent. See Heinold Commodities, Inc. v.
Elliott & F.J.E. Trading Co., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
23,566 (N.D. I11. 1987) (WESTLAW, DCT database). In Elliott, F.J.E. Trading
Company agreed to manage a branch office of the plaintiff in Texas to solicit commodity
futures and options brokerage business exclusively on behalf of the plaintiff. Id.
23,566, at 33,480. The agreement further provided that F.J.E. would receive 45% of
the commissions charged by the plaintiff for customer trades. See id. at 33,480-81.
If the plaintiff can utilize RICO to recover the losses it suffers as a result of its
employee's or agent's fraudulent activities, should the same remedy be denied its
customers whose business was solicited exclusively on its behalf by its agent?
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at a low corporate level, ' 294 these agents are bestowed with the high
level of responsibility of dealing directly with the customer and his
hard-earned money as representatives of the futures commission
merchant. 295
Moreover, the "wholly unwitting ' '2 96 FCM utilizes the monies
obtained from its agents' handling of customers' accounts whether
those accounts are handled honestly or fraudulently. 297 Professor G.
Robert Blakey, the primary drafter of RICO, 29 has commented that
the Parnes court incorrectly construed RICO. 299 The fact that the
defendant inevitably earned commissions when its employees acted
under their apparent authority to continuously defraud customers3 °°
"make the agency not a 'victim,' but a [principal], which hardly
casts the agency in a sympathetic role." '30 1
The apparent authority rule, well-settled within the federal court
system,30 2 provides further support for the use of RICO against
FCMs. The typical commodity frauds perpetrated against customers
by employees or agents of FCMs which become answerable under
RICO epitomize the rationale behind the rule: The agent's position
enables him to defraud the customer because, in the eyes of that
person, the employee still appears to be acting within the ordinary
course of the duties entrusted to him by the FCM. °3 Futures com-
mission merchants, just like other corporations, act only through
their agents and employees.?° When the act of an employee or agent
294. Parnes, 548 F. Supp. at 24 n.9.
295. See supra notes 8, 31, 286 and accompanying text; see also Parnes, 548 F.
Supp. at 21-22 (defendant's two employees solicited customer to open account; made
misrepresentations to him; traded his account without authorization; and concealed
extent of his losses).
296. Parnes, 548 F. Supp. at 24 n.9.
297. See supra notes 8, 268 and accompanying text; see also Ghouth, 642 F. Supp.
at 1330 (FCM charged customer commissions for unauthorized trades thereby profiting
from its agent's misconduct); Parnes, 548 F. Supp. at 21-22 (although amount of
commissions defendant received from its employees' fraud is not mentioned, customer
suffered over $35,000 in losses as result of that fraud).
298. Moran, supra note 51, at 742 n.51.
299. See Blakey, supra note 51, at 323 n.179.
300. See supra notes 280-81, 294-97 and accompanying text.
301. Blakey, supra note 51, at 323 n.179; see also Roche, 658 F. Supp. at 321
(FCM that was perpetrator or beneficiary of its agents' racketeering activity may be
both enterprise and culpable person under § 1962(a) of RICO).
302. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text; see also Parnes, 548 F. Supp.
at 23 (employees were conducting themselves within the scope of their authority). See
supra note 8 for the typical commodity fraud perpetrated by FCMs' employees or
agents against customers.
304. See supra notes 31, 292-95 and accompanying text.
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is within the scope of his employment or apparent authority, the
FCM should, like any other company, be legally responsible for
that act even under RICO.3"5 Given that, under federal law, cor-
porations have been held criminally liable for the acts of their agents
or employees, 3°6 should FCMs-or other organizations for that mat-
ter-be protected from civil RICO liability merely because the penalty
is treble damages?307
The Supreme Court has already declined to grant protection from
such a penalty. One month after Parnes was decided,30 8 the Court
affirmed treble-damages liability against a non-profit organization
for its agents' violations of federal antitrust laws, although the
organization itself derived no benefit whatsoever from its agents'
anticompetitive actions. 3°9 Thus the apparent authority rule imposes
even treble damages on the entity which is, after all, best situated
to prevent unlawful actions occurring through its employees' or
agents' positions in that organization.310 In short, the apparent au-
thority doctrine simply implements congressional intention that pri-
vate litigants utilize rights of action provided by statutes to deter
violations of the law. 11
305. See supra notes 142-54 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
307. See Blakey, supra note 51, at 323 n.179.
308. Compare Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (decided on Apr. 20) with American Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp.,
456 U.S. 556 (1982) (decided on May 17).
309. See Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 573-79.
310. See id. at 572-73. The Supreme Court also noted in Hydrolevel that the
apparent authority rule comports with Congress' desire that the antitrust laws sweep
broadly. Id. at 573 n.1 1. To illustrate this point, the Court highlighted that "Congress
extended antitrust liability to '[elvery person,' . . . and defined 'person' to include
corporations and associations." Id. (citations omitted). Similarly, Congress expressly
directed a broad construction of RICO. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
RICO, moreover, applies to and may be used by "any person," under which definition
a corporation also qualifies. See RICO §§ 1962, 1964(c) (1982); supra notes 12-18,
174-75 and accompanying text.
311. See Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 572-73 (citing Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308,
314 (1978); Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
139 (1968)); supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
In fact, the Court's observations about the antitrust laws in Hydrolevel are strikingly
similar to comments made about RICO. Compare Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 572 &
n.10 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) ("principal purpose of the antitrust
private cause of action ... is, of course, to deter anticompetitive practices....
Congress created the treble-damages remedy ... precisely for the purpose of en-
couraging private challenges to antitrust violations") with Alcorn County v. United
States Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1984) ("the provision
for attorney's fees in section 1964(c) was intended by Congress, like the provision
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Finally, only FCMs "can take systematic steps to make improper
conduct on the part of all [their] agents unlikely, and the possibility
of civil [RICO] liability will inevitably be a powerful incentive for
[FCMs] to take those steps.13 12 The requirement that a person
participate as a principal in the pattern of racketeering activity from
which that person directly or indirectly receives income, therefore,
should not bar the operation of section 1962(a) against futures
commission merchants.
B. The "Exclusive Remedy" Provision in Section 22 of the
CEA
The 1982 amendments to the CEA,313 enacted after the Supreme
Court supported an implied private right of action under the statute, a1
4
expressly provide that any person who violates the CEA shall be liable
for actual damages to the plaintiff caused by such violation.315 Congress
stated that the rights of action authorized by subsection 25 (section
22 of the CEA) and by sections 7a(ll) (exchange arbitrations),3 16 18
for treble damages, to encourage private enforcement of the laws on which RICO is
predicated . ". [and] to enlist the aid of civil claimants in deterring racketeering, as
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961"). See Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 494 (E.D.
Pa. 1983).
312. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 572.
313. See supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
.316. CEA § 5a(ll) requires exchanges to provide "a fair and equitable procedure
through arbitration ... for the settlement of customers' claims and grievances against
any member [of an exchange] or employee thereof. . . ." 7 U.S.C. § 7a(ll) (1982).
The $15,000 damages limitation on arbitrable controversies, supra note 98 and ac-
companying text, has been deleted from the section. See 7 U.S.C. § 7a(ll) (1982).
Only recently, the Supreme Court determined that RICO claims are arbitrable if the
underlying agreement provides for arbitration as a means for the resolution of disputes.
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2335, 2345-46 (1987).
Even prior to the Supreme Court's ruling, the Fifth Circuit compelled arbitration of
RICO claims relating to customers' commodity accounts. See Mayaja, Inc., S.A. v.
Bodkin, 803 F.2d 157, 158, 166 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Shearson Lehman Bros. v. Mayaja, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 3205 (1987).
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission has promulgated regulations pertaining
to arbitration. See CFTC Reg. §§ 180.1-180.5, 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1-180.5 (1987). The
Commission permits industry professionals, supra note 31, to enter into arbitration
agreements with a customer provided that the customer's signature on such an agreement
is not imposed as a condition precedent to the customer's utilization of the professionals'
services. See CFTC Reg. § 180.3(b), 17 C.F.R. § 180.3(b) (1987). Moreover, the
arbitration agreement must be endorsed separately and apart from the other provisions
of the customer's agreement with the professional. See id. The arbitration agreement
must also contain certain language printed in large boldface type:
Three forums exist for the resolution of commodity disputes: civil court
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(reparations proceedings),3' 7 and 21(b)(10) (futures association ar-
bitrations)" 8 of title 7 of the United States Code "shall be the
exclusive remedies under this chapter [the Commodity Exchange
Act]." 19 Thus, an argument can be made that the CEA precludes
litigation, reparations at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
and arbitration conducted by a self-regulatory or other private organization.
The CFTC recognizes that the opportunity to settle disputes by arbitration
may in some cases provide many benefits to customers, including the ability
to obtain an expeditious and final resolution of disputes without incurring
substantial costs. The CFTC requires, however, that each customer indi-
vidually examine the relative merits of arbitration and that your consent
to this arbitration agreement be voluntary.
By signing this agreement, you: (1) may be waiving your right to sue
in a court of law; and (2) are agreeing to be bound by arbitration of any
claims which you or [name] may submit to arbitration under this agree-
ment. ... You need not sign this agreement to open an account with
[name]. See 17 C.F.R. 180.1-180.5.
CFTC Reg. § 180.3(b)(6), 17 C.F.R. § 180.3(b)(6) (1987). The plain language of the
regulations and the CEA demonstrate that these regulations apply to any dispute
arising out of commodity futures trading, including non-CEA claims. See Felkner v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 800 F.2d 1466, 1468-69 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, by signing
the arbitration agreement, the customer will likely be unable to litigate his RICO
claim in federal court.
This author recommends Exchange arbitration proceedings as the best means through
which a customer may receive a prompt, relatively inexpensive and fair resolution of
his dispute or claim. As an employee of the New York Cotton Exchange, this author
observed the impartiality, personal integrity and dedication of both the members of
the Exchange's Arbitration Committee and the staff. These same characteristics are
likely to be found in the arbitrators and staff of other exchanges as well. Lastly, this
author is both honored and gratified to have been affiliated with the men and women
of the New York Cotton Exchange and Mound, Cotton & Wollan, the Exchange's
outside counsel.
317. Under the CEA, the word "person" includes individuals, associations, part-
nerships, corporations and trusts. CEA § 2(a)(l)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 14
of the CEA, "Reparations Procedure," grants the CFTC authority to hear customer
complaints against persons registered under the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1982); see supra
note 99 and accompanying text. In conjunction with Part 12 of the CFTC's regulations
pertaining to reparations codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 12.1-12.408, the section simply
provides that any person who wishes to complain of any violation of the CEA or
any rule, regulation or order thereunder committed by any person registered under
the Act "may, at any time within two years after the cause of action accrues, apply
to the CFTC for an order awarding actual damages proximately caused by such
violation." CEA § 14(a), 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1982).
318. Section 17(b)(10) of the CEA requires registered futures associations to establish
rules providing for the arbitration of customer disputes or claims. 7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(10)
(1982). Such rules must conform to Part 180 of the CFTC's regulations governing
contract market arbitration and dispute settlement procedures. See CFTC Reg. § 170.8,
17 C.F.R. § 170.8 (1987). See supra note 316 for a discussion of contract market
arbitrations. At present, one registered futures association exists: the National Futures
Association (NFA).
319. CEA § 22(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
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the application of RICO because the predicate acts necessary to
establish RICO jurisdiction-mail or wire fraud-are intertwined
with violations of the CEA32° which already prescribes the claimant's
exclusive remedies.
The language of the CEA itself, however, refutes such an argument.
The Act unequivocally sets forth that nothing in it "shall supersede
or limit the jurisdiction conferred on courts of the United States
or any State. 3 21 This provision was enacted in 1974 to clarify that
nothing in the CEA, specifically the provision vesting the CFTC
with exclusive jurisdiction regarding commodity futures activities,
would supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on federal or
state courts at that time.122 Congress had already vested the federal
courts with the authority to hear RICO claims four years earlier.
3 23
Moreover, courts have generally held that the CEA pre-empts private
actions derived from other statutes only when such actions could
conceivably conflict with the CFTC's regulatory role. 24 As RICO
actions do not infringe upon the Commission's regulatory authority,
such actions are not pre-empted by the CEA.3 25
Although these arguments are borne primarily under section 2 of
the Commodity Exchange Act,3 26 they apply equally to section 22.
Again, a plain reading of the CEA demonstrates that nothing in it
was intended to eviscerate pre-existing jurisdiction under other federal
laws.3 27 In order for RICO to be barred from redressing activities
concurrently violative of the CEA, the later-enacted section 22 must
have been clearly intended by Congress to repeal or to be a substitute
for the earlier RICO Act.3 2 Such legislative intent "must be [man-
ifested by a] positive repugnancy between the provisions. 3 29 Given
the sparse legislative history of section 22330 and its five-year co-
320. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
322. See id.
323. See id.
324. Taylor v. Bear Stearns, 572 F. Supp. 667, 674 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
325. See Vaccariello v. Financial Partners Brokerage, Ltd., [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,523, at 97,019 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (WESTLAW,
DCT database).
326. See supra notes 321-25 and accompanying text.
327. See Pollock v. Citrus Assocs. of the New York Cotton Exch., Inc., 512 F.
Supp. 711, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
328. See United States v. Abrahams, 493 F. Supp. 296, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
329. Id.
330. Sackheim, Commodities Litigation: The Impact of RICO, 34 DE PAuL L.
REv. 23, 70-71 (1984).
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existence with RICO, any allegation of repugnancy between the
statutes is untenable.
Moreover, RICO claims do not arise under the CEA; they arise
under RICO and the defendants' alleged predicate acts of mail and
wire fraud.3 ' Courts have recognized a similar distinction between
claims arising under the CEA and the antitrust laws, which have
been traditionally applied to the commodity futures industr:3 3 2 In
fact, more than one court has ruled that the CEA does not repeal
the federal mail and wire fraud statutes.3 33 Thus, even where Congress
has enacted comprehensive legislation to govern conduct in a par-
ticular field, courts have acknowledged the continued vitality of the
mail and wire fraud statutes, 334 assuring the continued vitality of
RICO claims based on violations of these statutes. Although the
CEA only provides for actual damages,3" the Act has been widely
construed as preserving, not pre-empting, common law remedies
for fraud based on violations of the CEA even to the extent of punitive
damages.33 6
In short, the CEA and RICO cannot be read to conflict with one
another such that the former impliedly repeals the latter.33 7 The
"exclusive remedies" provided in section 22 of the CEA are available
for violations of "this chapter"-the Commodity Exchange Act. 3 1
Similarly, RICO's treble-damages remedy may be used by any person
injured by reason of a violation of section 1962 of "this chapter"-
the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act.339 RICO and
331. Bartels v. Clayton Brokerage Co., 631 F. Supp. 442, 450 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
332. See Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 28, 31 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Simplot v. Strobl, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985).
333. See United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 310 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 919 (1980); Abrahams, 493 F. Supp. at 300 n.8
334. See Abrahams, 493 F. Supp. at 302. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the mail and wire fraud statutes under commodity-related
RICO claims.
335. See supra notes 313-15 and accompanying text.
336. See Embeita v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,594, at 30,555 (E.D. Va. 1985) (WESTLAW, DCT database)
(quoting Kerr v. First Commodity Corp., 735 F.2d 281, 288 (8th Cir. 1984)); see also
Mallen v. Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 203, 205 (N.D. Ga. 1985)
(defendant's argument that private cause of action under § 22 of CEA indicates
Congress' intent to preempt state causes of action unpersuasive).
337. See Abrahams, 493 F. Supp. at 303.
338. See supra notes 110-15, 316-19 and accompanying text. "Phrases such as 'under
this chapter' and 'of this chapter' indicate Congress' intention to provide that the
remedies under § 22 are the only remedies that the [Commodity Exchange] Act
authorizes. Nowhere in the Act, however, does it say that these remedies are the only
remedies available to a plaintiff." Mallen, 623 F. Supp. at 206 (emphasis in original).
339. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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the CEA simply provide different remedies for different wrongs
although similar conduct may violate both statutes, just as similar
conduct may violate both the CEA and the antitrust laws. 340 The
provisions of the CEA and RICO, therefore, are not repugnant to
each other; rather, they complement one another a.3 4 The two Acts
"can exist and be useful, side by side'' 42 in protecting the customers
of the commodity futures industry. This protection, which the pro-
gressive amendments to the CEA have fortified, 343 becomes imperative
given the customer's role in the industry344 and the role of the
industry in the nation's economy. 45
V. Conclusion
In reality, many federal courts have been more intent on redrafting
than on reading RICO. 46 The fact that RICO is used against le-
gitimate businesses, such as futures commission merchants, does not
mean that the Act is being misconstrued.3 47 As this Note has es-
tablished, RICO can and should be applied against FCMs for viol-
ations of the Act perpetrated by their agents or employees acting
within the scope of their employment.3 48 Given the impact of the
commodity futures industry on the nation's economy and the cus-
tomer's role therein, RICO actually assists the CEA in protecting
the customer, the industry, and, most importantly, the commerce
of the United States.
Under RICO, Congress provided no exception for businessmen,
white collar workers, bankers, stockbrokers or commodity brokers. 349
Although commodity fraud actionable under RICO may sometimes
be characterized as "garden variety" fraud, Congress has simply
provided additional means to eradicate that fraud.350 If Congress
340. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
341. Cf. Abrahams, 493 F. Supp. at 303 (mail fraud statute and CEA complement
each other).
342. Id. at 302 (quoting Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473, 484 (1941)).
343. See supra notes 77-125 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 79-82, 121-25 and accompanying text.
346. Blakey, supra note 51, at 285.
347. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985).
348. See supra notes 221-345 and accompanying text.
349. See Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 529 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 473 U.S. 922 (1985); see also United States v.
Carter, 493 F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1974) (wearing white collar does not protect violators
of Act from liability).
350. See Furman, 741 F.2d at 529.
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wants to prevent "garden variety" fraud claims involving the op-
eration of FCMs and other legitimate enterprises from metamor-
phasizing into RICO claims, it may do so by striking mail and wire
fraud from the list of predicate acts in the statute.35" ' Such action
must be undertaken by the legislature, however, not the courts.35 2
If Congress determines that RICO claims should not be directed
at futures commission merchants, it may directly proscribe such
claims by amending section 22 of the Commodity Exchange Act as
follows:
(2) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the rights
of action authorized by this subsection and by sections 7a(l1),
18, and 21(b)(10) of this title shall be the exclusive remedies under
this chapter and chapter 96 of title 18, United States Code,3"
available to any person who sustains loss as a result of, or con-
nected with, any alleged violation of this chapter.
Robert G. Lendino
351. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1356 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1002 (1983).
352. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text; see also Sun Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 194 (9th Cir. 1987) (courts should not erect artificial
barriers to keep RICO cases off federal dockets); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp.
476, 493 n.21 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (improper for judiciary to narrow purposely broad
statute; such action is within province of Congress).
353. Chapter 96 of title 18 of the United States Code is, of course, RICO. See
supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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